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PREFACE

The essays in this book are based on lectures presented at Western Michigan
University during the academic year, 1988-89. The occasion was the 25th an
niversary of an annual lecture series under the direction of the faculty of the
Department of Economics at Western Michigan University.
For each of the preceding 24 years, the Department had invited six
distinguished economists to discuss a particular topic. These topics ranged from
"Freedom and Capitalism" (1963-64) to "The Economics of Environmental
Problems" (1971-72) to "The Economics of International Migration"
(1984-85). In order to properly celebrate the 25-year milestone, it seemed fit
ting to extend ourselves to examine the state of the entire discipline and to
invite the most noted economists of our time those who have been awarded
the Nobel Prize in Economics to do the examining.
There are a number of people to whom I am very grateful. First, to the Nobel
Laureates who were willing to participate. Second, to my colleagues at the
W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and especially to its direc
tor, Robert Spiegelman, for generous support. Third, to my "bosses" at the
University, including President Diether H. Haenicke (to whom this volume
is dedicated), Provost George M. Dennison, and Deans A. Bruce Clarke and
David O. Lyon. And finally, but certainly not least, to my colleagues in the
Economics Department, especially my co-authors in another venture, Martin
Bronfenbrenner (visiting professor) and Way land Gardner, who have taught
me a great deal of macroeconomics, and Myron H. Ross and Raymond E.
Zelder, who served on my committee.

Werner Sichel
June 1989
Kalamazoo, Michigan
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Introduction
Each year the President of the United States presents a "State of the
Union" message. In it the President outlines accomplishments and
challenges. While not completely analogous, we believe that the same
approach, perhaps not on an annual basis, is appropriate with regard
to a discipline. Economics is a particularly good candidate. It is a
discipline very often maligned ("If you would lay economists end to
end, they still wouldn't reach a conclusion.") yet simultaneously held
in high esteem and accorded respect, as evidenced by how frequently
economists are requested to advise government officials or business ex
ecutives and how often they are sought for interviews on radio and TV
and for writing opinion columns and editorials in newspapers and
magazines.
What is the state of economic science as we begin the 1990s? Ob
viously, this is a normative question. It involves a value judgment. Whom
shall we ask? Many people have an opinion. But who can provide the
most authoritative answers? We believe that the respondents must be
professional economists practitioners rather than just observers. And
who among economists? We suggest that they should be economists in
1

that small select group who have been honored by being chosen to receive
the top prize in economics Nobel Laureates in economics.
The Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics is a ''Johnny-comelately." It was added nearly 70 years after the prizes in chemistry,
literature, medicine or physiology, peace, and physics. The first one,
shared by Ragnar Frisch of Norway and Jan Tinbergen of the
Netherlands, was awarded in 1969. To date, only 26 economists have
received the award. Fifteen of these were Americans. According to the
rules established by the Central Bank of Sweden, the benefactor of the
economics award, "The Prize shall be awarded annually to a person
who has carried out a work in economic science of the eminent
significance expressed in the Will of Alfred Nobel."
Having come to the conclusion that we wanted Nobel Laureate
economists to present State of Economic Science messages, our next
task was to attract six of them to do so. For pragmatic reasons, we limited
our invitations to Americans. We were delighted with the results. Our
invitations were graciously accepted by Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert M.
Solow, Lawrence R. Klein, James Tobin, James M. Buchanan, and
Herbert A. Simon. We believe they are an outstanding group, not only
because of their eminence, but also because they provide a good represen
tation of the spectrum of economic thought.
As most readers will correctly predict, the essays by Robert Solow,
Lawrence Klein and James Tobin address the state of macroeconomics,
while Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan and Herbert Simon make more
of an attempt to cover all of economics.
Kenneth J. Arrow, the recipient of the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economics,
has for the past 35 years focused on and made major contributions to
the theories of individual and social choice and general economic
equilibrium. As the first speaker in the series and author of the first
essay in this volume, he devotes some space to his perception of what
economics is and does studying the relation between the individual
and the system as it pertains to exchange and the transformation of
resources and products.
Arrow enumerates what he considers to be the three most significant
developments in economics during the last 50 years: (1) the greater

recognition of the importance of the time dimension in economic
behavior; (2) the related appreciation of the need to study human behavior
under conditions of uncertainty; and (3) the understanding that infor
mation and knowledge are significant economic variables.
According to Arrow, economic science now recognizes that a dif
ferent set of expectations (whether rational or not) about the future leads
to a different present world, but he laments that as yet there are few
markets established for future purchases and sales. Economic science
has introduced uncertainty a consequence of being concerned about
the future into its theories. This has strengthened the concept of ra
tionality because it tells us more about the economic behavior of actors
to whom economists assign probability distributions to possible out
comes. Arrow, who defines "information" as any observation that
changes a person's probability judgment, points out that economists must
concern themselves with the consequences of informational inequalities.
Arrow sides with fellow Nobel Laureate, Herbert Simon (the final
speaker in this series), in his admiration for the work of cognitive
psychologists who have studied the abilities of humans to make rational
choices. Arrow sees value for economics in their findings of systematic
biases of a nonrational nature stemming from overconfidence, fram
ing, and exaggerated response to information. He closes on the note
that economic science, with the support of psychology and of computer
science, faces the challenge of knowing better "how we come to ac
quire knowledge and form beliefs and how we act and can act on that
knowledge."
The second essay is by Robert M. Solow, a much more recent (1987)
recipient of the Nobel Prize. He is best known for his development of
the theoretical foundation as well as the empirical measurement and
estimation of the effect of technological change on output.
Solow asserts that "macroeconomics is what it is all about" a view
clearly shared by Klein and Tobin, whose essays follow. Solow pro
vides an excellent historical review of macroeconomic thought, begin
ning with pre-Keynes business cycle theory and ending with new-classical
theory on the one hand and with what he calls new American-Keynesian
theory on the other. In between, of course, came the contributions by

Keynes himself, as well as those by monetarists, expectationists, and
supply-siders.
In Solow's view, the new-classical approach of "grounding
macroeconomic models in complete individual-agent-based
microeconomic theory . . . has been a blind alley in practice ..." with
"no great empirical or predictive successes." Instead, he believes,
economists ought to study the "macro foundations of microeconomics."
(Buchanan the author of the fifth essay in this volume would take
issue with that.) Solow finds that at least one group of new-Keynesians
is making progress in this direction. This group places emphasis on im
perfect competition, increasing returns to scale and trading externalities
and concludes that the economy may be capable of many "self-sustaining
equilibria" rather than just a single price-mediated market-clearing
equilibrium. Solow sees macroeconomic science as in a state not yet
fit for empirical application, but one where some economists are at least
seeking to find the mechanisms that cause the economic system to
malfunction. If they succeed, it may then be possible to formulate policies
that would be beneficial. He opposes what he perceives to be the newclassical view that the market failures in question are "mere aberra
tions" of the system. Solow maintains that they indeed are the system.
What's wrong, Solow asks, with having a number of useful little models
in the macroeconomist's arsenal and then choosing the relevant one for
the particular condition that the economy is in? That is, of course, a
rhetorical question. That is the sort of macroeconomic development to
which he looks forward.
The third essay is written by Lawrence R. Klein, recipient of the 1980
Nobel Prize. He is the founder of Wharton Econometric Forecasting
Associates and has long been considered the chief architect of the large
econometric forecasting model.
Klein discusses the state of economic science as it pertains to his
specialty, macroeconometrics "the use of econometrics for the study
of the macroeconomy." Klein's views concerning the history of
macroeconomics the contributions made by the various schools of
thought and what has worked and what has not differ little from those
of Solow. Klein too recognizes Keynes as the great innovator, but admits

that the Keynesian model has benefited from later contributors who have
helped beef up the supply side and the financial sector. Monetarism,
in his view, has not passed the econometric test. And as concerns the
new classical macroeconomics, he acknowledges that macro theory may
be constructed as a system built upon an aggregation of microeconomic
relationships, but insists that macro relationships have "a life of their
own" and can be specified directly. Once they are, data can be applied,
the system can be estimated, and it can be used for policy analysis.
Klein disapproves of what he sees as a trend toward using smaller
more compact and simplified econometric models. Instead of using
"the smallest system that is capable of explaining the facts of life,"
he favors using "the largest system that can be managed."
Klein acknowledges that forecasting is difficult, but contends that it
cannot and should not be avoided. Reaction is too slow to be effective.
He is somewhat optimistic that macroeconometric forecasting will
improve but does not anticipate much help from those who rely on
own-generated expectations. He sees the most promise in the use of
"high-frequency" data to help adjust quarterly econometric models.
Klein ends his essay on the state of macroeconometrics on a mixed
note. On the one hand, he is gratified to see some models, particularly
the two-gap model, employed successfully in a number of centrally
planned and/or developing economies. On the other hand, he sees no
major breakthroughs "in the vast volume of research material that is
being published" and finds that what is most popular with today's bright
young scholars is really quite sterile.
The fourth essay is by James Tobin, recipient of the 1981 Nobel Prize
in Economics. During the past 45 years, Tobin has focused on and made
major contributions in the fields of macroeconomic theory, monetary
theory and policy, portfolio theory, economic growth, and consumer
behavior.
Tobin is very much in the same camp as Solow and Klein. He too
is only interested in discussing the state of macroeconomics and con
cludes that Keynes is really not vulnerable to the attacks by the newclassicals who appear to prefer to deal with a caricature of the Keyne
sian theory of business fluctuations than with what Keynes actually pro
fessed and wrote.

Tobin focuses on what he calls the fundamental issue in
macroeconomics "the existence, reliability, strength, and speed of ad
justments by which a market economy maintains or restores
economy wide equilibrium" between the supply and demand for labor
and what it produces. He explains that Keynes did not assume wage
rigidity, but rather only that workers are concerned with relative wage
parity. They very much resist nominal wage cuts, but are willing to
accept real wage cuts in the form of price increases.
Furthermore, Tobin argues that contemporary "anti-Keynesian 'NewClassical' counterrevolutionaries" do not understand that even if wages
and prices were flexible, there would still be unemployment in the
presence of inadequate real demand. Flexible prices do not fully ab
sorb demand shocks instantaneously.
Tobin is concerned that the new-classicals have made macroeconomics
a "babble of parables" and that their stories in many respects do not
resemble the real world. He considers microeconomics to be "a
framework of analysis" rather than "a source of specific conclusions
about the signs and magnitudes of relationships among economic
variables." Tobin, perhaps more than any of the other contributors to
this volume, observes a worrisome state of macroeconomic science:
"There is a big gulf between academic macroeconomics and the
macroeconomics oriented to contemporary events and policies."
The fifth essay in this volume is contributed by James M. Buchanan,
the 1986 recipient of the Nobel Prize. He is the modern developer of
the theory of public choice and has made major contributions to the
development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory
of political decisionmaking and public economics.
Buchanan's essay differs from all the others in this volume, but most
especially from the three (Solow, Klein, Tobin) that precede it. Not
only does Buchanan not address the state of macroeconomic science,
he asserts that there is no place for macroeconomics, either as a part
of positive or normative economics. He considers Keynesian-inspired
macroeconomics to be a "monumental misdirection of scientific effort"
since it largely ignores the structure of the economy. In many respects,
Buchanan also disagrees with Arrow because Buchanan rejects the

commonly used methodology of maximizing objective functions sub
ject to particular constraints. He believes that economists have been
wasting their time focusing on scarcity, choice and value maximiza
tion. Buchanan also does not share many of Simon's ideas, but there
does appear to be one important commonality between the two both
consider themselves "outsider" economists. In fact, one gets the im
pression that they enjoy that status.
Buchanan characterizes himself as a methodological and normative
individualist, a radical subjectivist, a contractarian, and a constitu
tionalist. He views the economy as an order a constitutional order.
Thus he sees voluntary exchange as mutually utility-enhancing, since
it is based upon agreement between the parties engaged in the exchange.
Furthermore, he contends that, as an order, the economy enables per
formance to be evaluated in terms of results that are conceptually a part
of the behavior of individuals acting within the order itself.
The state of economic science is not to Buchanan's liking. He would
prefer to see economics (as a social science) concentrate on the topic
of trade or exchange and the institutions that effect trade, such as con
tracts and "the whole realm of collective agreement on the constitu
tional rules of political society."
The final essay in this volume is contributed by Herbert A. Simon,
who received the Nobel Prize in 1978. During the past 30 years he has
focused on decisionmaking and problemsolving processes, using com
puters to simulate human thinking.
Simon's essay deals with the state of the methodology employed in
economic science. He perceives it to be in great need of reform and
makes a number of important observations and concrete suggestions.
Simon has no doubt about economics being a science. He believes that
the profession's poor economic forecasting record is not an indication
of its unscientific nature. He generalizes that one should be wary of
using prediction as a test of science since an understanding of mechanisms
does not guarantee predictability.
Simon observes that economists agree a great deal more than is ap
parent to the general public. After all, most economists subscribe to
a central core of theory, and even more important, to a way of reasoning

about economic questions. The problem, he suggests, is that economists
disagree about "auxiliary assumptions" concerning matters such as what
information people have and how they deal with uncertainty. Simon
strongly counsels that economists need to vigorously test their auxiliary
hypotheses. He warns against "theory without measurement," and urges
economists to grub for facts, to worry less about predictability and more
about whether their assumptions are correct (a view opposite to that
presented by fellow Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman in his well-known
1953 essay, "The Methodology of Positive Economics"), and to work
with less aggregated data so that there is a better fit between theory
and data.
As noted earlier in this introduction, Simon and Arrow both contend
that economists should pay closer attention to the work done by cognitive
psychologists who have developed both (1) a large body of empirically
tested theory about decisionmaking and problemsolving, and (2) some
techniques that use computers to simulate complex human thought
processes.
Simon recommends that economists conduct more laboratory ex
periments and field studies and, in that context, learn how to obtain
data about beliefs, attitudes and expectations. He is fairly confident that
the reform he calls for will be forthcoming since "the inability of
economics today to play the policy role to which it aspires is a major
source of pressure toward reform."
In this introduction we have attempted to provide the reader with
"coming attractions" that whet the appetite. Each of the six essays that
follow deserves careful reading. While brief, this collection is packed
with ideas and insights accumulated over many years by six of the most
outstanding twentieth century scholars in economic science.

KENNETH J. ARROW is Consultant to the Rand Corporation and
Senior Fellow by Courtesy of the Hoover Institution at Stanford Univer
sity. During the past thirty-five years he has focused on and made major
contributions to the theories of individual and social choice and of general
economic equilibrium.
Professor Arrow earned a B.S. degree in Social Science from
City University of New York and M. A. and Ph.D. degrees from Col
umbia University. He has been awarded more than a dozen honorary
degrees from U.S. and foreign universities including Harvard, Chicago,
Columbia, Yale, Pennsylvania, City University of New York, Hebrew
University, and Cambridge. Professor Arrow taught for one year at
the University of Chicago before accepting an appointment at Stanford
University. Later, he taught for eleven years at Harvard University before
returning to Stanford. He has also served as a visiting professor at MIT,
Cambridge University, the Institute for Advanced Study in Vienna, and
the European University Institute.
Dr. Arrow is a past president of the American Economic Association,
the Econometric Society, the Institute of Management Sciences, the
Western Economic Association, the International Economic Association
and the International Society for Inventory Research. In 1957, he was
awarded the John Bates Clark Medal by the American Economic Associa
tion. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American
Philosophical Society, and the Institute of Medicine. He is also a Fellow
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics, the American Statistical Association, and the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. He recently
received the von Neumann Prize of the Institute of Management Sciences
and the Operations Research Society of America.
Professor Arrow is the author of about 20 books and over 165 articles
in scholarly journals and books. Titles of Dr. Arrow's books that are
indicative of his work include: Social Choice and Individual Values,
Studies in Linear and Non-Linear Programming, Aspects of the Theory
of Risk-Bearing, General Competitive Analysis, The Limits of Organiza
tion, and Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision Making. In addi
tion, Harvard University Press has published six volumes of Collected
Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow.
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Dr. Kenneth J. Arrow
Joan Kenney Professor of Economics
and Professor of Operations Research
Stanford University
Recipient of the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economics

In the context of a modern economy, economic science tries to ex
plain what and how much all of us buy and sell, what prices we pay
and receive, and the effects of taxes and expenditures by the govern
ment. These few words contain a tremendous variety of activities and
phenomena. We humans buy and sell not only chickens, which yield
immediate satisfaction, but also factories and machines, which yield
outputs and revenues in the future. We buy and sell such sophisticated
commodities as securities, i.e., bonds and stocks. These are obligations
to pay and receive amounts of money (itself a stage removed from goods
in a simple sense) at points in the future and, in the case of stocks, the
amounts are not even prescribed but depend on future events and deci
sions not completely predictable at the time of the securities transfer.
The prices we receive or pay include such abstractions as a rate of
interest.
This is a very incomplete survey of the subject matter that economics
seeks to explain. Economics is the attempt to systematize all these
phenomena, to find underlying regularities and patterns in the relations
among the prices and quantities it studies. It seeks to understand the
basic motives that guide the economic agents in their decisions, and
it tries to draw the implications of these motives for the evolution of
prices and quantities. It is fair to say that economics was given its
11
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present orientation by Adam Smith, whose book, An Enquiry Concern
ing the Wealth of Nations, was published in 1776 a date otherwise of
considerable significance. It was his great insight that there is a mutual
interaction between the workings of the economic system and the ac
tions of every individual. The overall magnitudes, totals sold and bought,
prices paid and received, are the result of the actions of individuals,
but in turn the system magnitudes control the actions of individuals.
Even though everyone is trying to act to his or her own benefit, the
results may correspond to no one's intent. For example, a firm will
seek to maximize its profits (that is, make them as large as possible)
taking as given the prices it pays for inputs and receives for outputs.
But competition among many firms, each maximizing profits, results
in minimum profits. The elaboration of the interconnectedness of the
economy and the reciprocity between the system and the individual has
been a fine example of international scientific intercourse over more
than two centuries, as what the Scotsman Smith introduced was further
developed by the Frenchman, Leon Walras, and the Italian, Vilfredo
Pareto.
The economic system performs several functions, but the one that
is most stressed by modern economists is the allocation of resources.
Goods flow from place to place. They start from farm or mine through
various stages of transformation to end in the hands of their ultimate
consumers. Where and to whom they go and what processes are per
formed are the result of myriad individual economic decisions all pro
foundly influenced by the conditions of the market. Goods will not be
produced if the prices received do not cover the costs of production
or if there is no one who will buy them.
What is remarkable about the process by which the market system
allocates resources is that it requires surprisingly little knowledge of
the entire system by any one individual. The seller need only know there
is a buyer willing to pay a suitable price and does not need to know
(and usually does not know) why the buyer wants the product, whether
to resell or to use in further production. This economy of vision is not
merely the product of a modern complex society. In Athens of the 5th
century B.C., Herodotus, the "Father of History" and certainly an
unusually well-informed man of his day, did not know the ultimate source
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of the tin which the Greeks imported to make bronze. All he knew was
that the Greek settlers in what is now Marseilles bought tin from mer
chants who brought it down the Rhone. We know now that it ultimate
ly came from Britain, a land whose very existence had only legendary
meaning to Herodotus.
As economists see it, the chief coordinating instruments are prices.
A price is an incentive to sellers or producers and a penalty to buyers.
If there is a serious imbalance between supply and demand, prices rise
or fall to bring the two into balance. Thus, if there is more supply than
demand at a given price, competition among sellers brings prices down,
both reducing supply and increasing demand. An equilibrium is a set
of prices for which the corresponding inducements to sellers and buyers
lead to equality of supply and demand on each market. The price system
explains the limited need for knowledge by any one participant; it is
necessary to know only the prices of the commodities in which he or
she deals.
Economists differ as to the degree to which equilibria are actually
attained. Some argue that the economy is very nearly in equilibrium
all of the time; others, like myself, point to recurrent unemployment
and to the nonexistence of markets for future sale and delivery as serious
deficiencies in the equilibrium account of the economic world. But all
agree that the tendencies toward equilibrium are real and important.
With this sketch of what economics is all about, let me turn to what
I regard as the most significant and indeed dramatic developments of
the last 50 years: the fuller and deeper exploration of the time dimen
sion in economic behavior, the importance of uncertainty, and the
recognition of information and knowledge as significant economic
variables. These are interrelated developments, as we shall see.
Exchange and transformation of goods are the key economic
phenomena, as has been emphasized. But these can occur not only over
space or across industries but also over time. Individuals live for ex
tended periods of time. They have concern, not only for their own futures
but for their children and others beyond their own lifetime. Production
takes time. The farmer plants first and harvests only after a period of
time. Factory production also takes time. The production of a given
commodity is not only a time-consuming process but also requires the
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use of instruments, whether machines or buildings, which wear out only
gradually and over very long periods of time. Inventories are essential
for the smooth running of production and have to be held for some period
of time, though usually brief. Wine must be held for several years to
achieve its full potential, and the greater the wine the more it will im
prove with age. Electric power generating plants have effective lifetimes
of 30 years and more; dams for power or for irrigation may be useful
for a century.
The choices of the amounts and durabilities of investment projects
are based on two values. One is the individual desire to protect oneself
for the future, that is, to save; the other is the usefulness of investment
in creating new valuable products in the more or less distant future.
The saver will use the money not expended on current consumption
to purchase bonds or stocks, whose sale finances investment. More fun
damentally, we can see that for the economy as a whole the resources
diverted from consumption by the individuals' desire to save are made
available for investment.
How are these desires on the parts of different sectors of the economy
coordinated or, in technical language, brought into equilibrium? There
are now two periods in which transactions must take place, in the pres
ent and in the future, when the product resulting from the investment
becomes available. Today we have current markets for bonds or
securities or other instruments of saving, and these operate like other
markets. There are prices for these securities; in the case of bonds, the
price effectively determines the rate of interest. But in the future, there
is no such simple step. The product to be produced has to find a market.
But there is not today any market for future sales and purchases of goods,
with some few exceptions, and therefore no prices for them.
The profitability of an investment, therefore, can never be calculated
from market data at the time of investment. Future prices are "expected"
or "anticipated." We move from the concrete world of markets and
market prices to a less solid realm of expectation. Now forming expec
tations and acting on them are surely among the most characteristic of
human actions. Shakespeare put this observation in the mouth of that
most reflective character Hamlet: "Sure, he that made us with such
large discourse,/ Looking before and after, gave us not/ That capabili-
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ty and god-like reason/ To fust in us unused." (Hamlet, Act IV, Scene
4). It is not only future prices that one must look "before"; more general
ly, the future conditions under which production and consumption will
take place must be anticipated, for they are not currently known. Family
size, market conditions, innovations whether to facilitate one's produc
tivity or to create competitors, and weather conditions are among the
innumerable conditions which will shape our decisions tomorrow and
which therefore affect today's decisions to save or to invest.
The image or expectation of the future, therefore, shapes the pre
sent. What we expect for the future will affect the amount we wish to
save and how we distribute that amount among alternative ways of sav
ing. What we expect for the future will also determine the directions
in which we plan investments and therefore take at least the first steps
to embody our plans in concrete and metal. But these decisions have
concrete effects today. A high willingness to save reduces current con
sumption. It may cause workers, therefore, to shift from consumption
goods industries to investment goods industries, from garments to con
struction. Workers may have to shift geographically to implement the
interindustrial shift. A different set of expectations about the future leads
to a different present world.
To digress for a minute, the principle here goes beyond economics.
Images of future peace or war determine our present armaments and
military preparations and may indeed lead to war or peace now. Ex
pectations of good or bad future lives can influence our present attitude
towards life, towards having children, towards developing or not
developing social and cultural skills.
The elaboration of this picture of the economic world, in which the
anticipations of the future affect the present and, of course, our present
actions in investment and savings, help to determine the future, which
I take to be perhaps the leading development in economic theory and
analysis in the last 50 or 60 years. Let me mention by name the great
pioneers of the 1930s, Ragnar Frisch, of Norway, and John R. Hicks,
who died at the time these words were being written. These names are
not household words like John Maynard Keynes, yet I would hold that
their works are even today more influential in the practice of economics.
Subsequent elaboration has resulted in an increasingly sophisticated set
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of models of economic action over time, followed by empirical im
plementation of at least certain aspects, most noticeably in the securities
markets, to which I will return a bit later.
I have emphasized the future, but the future always brings uncertain
ty. Perhaps the greatest intellectual step of all in our understanding of
the role of time in economics has been the explicit recognition of uncer
tainty as an economic fact and as a factor recognized by individuals
in their market behavior. Investors and savers alike are aware of the
universality of uncertainty. They are uncertain about future prices, about
future technology, about future preferences for goods.
Yet it is only after 1947 that economists and decision analysts
developed explicit methods for assisting individuals, firms and govern
ments in making decisions under uncertainty and to study the equilibrium
configuration of the economy when agents are uncertain about the future
and know they are uncertain. The study of this topic has transformed
the content of economics, more perhaps than might be expected on first
consideration.
The study of human behavior under uncertainty deepened and inten
sified our understanding of one of the basic and most enduring themes
in economic analysis, the notion of rationality. Implicitly in Adam Smith,
explicitly in the economic theorists of the last quarter of the nineteenth
century who in many ways set the basic structure of modern economics,
the actors in the economy are considered to be rational beings in their
choices.
First of all, firms are supposed to be rational in the sense that they
seek, successfully, to maximize their profits under the conditions they
face. This implies, for example, that each firm chooses methods of pro
duction that make as small as possible the cost of production of whatever
amount is produced and produces that quantity which will yield the
largest profit possible, that is, the excess of revenue over cost is max
imized. Rationality is identified with maximization; a rational firm will
not rest content with one level of profits if by changing either its methods
of production or its quantity produced it can make higher profits. Sec
ond, each consumer or household is assumed to choose the quantities
of the different goods consumed (and amount of labor supplied) so as
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to maximize some measure of the satisfaction the consumer receives,
given the prices the household faces and the income it has.
These have been the traditional criteria for economic rationality. Under
conditions of uncertainty, however, the concept of rationality becomes
stronger, that is, says more about the behavior of economic actors. It
is required that there be consistency among choices made under dif
ferent conditions of uncertainty. To state in detail these criteria and their
justification would take more space than is deserved here; but they can
be made very persuasive indeed. They lead to the following standard
formulation: We do not know which of several different possible out
comes will occur, but we can assign probabilities to each possible out
come. The actions taken by firms and households are like bets, in that
the outcome of any such action (investment, act of saving) depends both
on the action taken and the outcome in fact realized (e.g., which horse
will win in a racetrack bet, what future product prices will be). In this
language, I give one example of a rationality assumption: If you are
willing to bet on an event, and the odds change in your favor, you are
still willing to make the bet.
Earlier, when discussing the way resources are allocated over time,
I stressed the importance of expectations of future prices. When uncer
tainty is recognized, the concept of expectations is broadened. There
is no single price expected; the investor or saver is uncertain about future
prices and knows he or she is uncertain. Economic actors hold pro
bability distributions of future prices for each commodity and each time
period in the future. Put a slightly different way, there is a set of con
tingent prices, one for each commodity in each time period under each
of the possible states of affairs that may prevail between now and the
time in question. For example, we might have a price for wheat next
year contingent on the weather that prevails in the intervening period.
Actually, in fuller detail, we should have a price for wheat next year
contingent on the weather, demand conditions here and in foreign coun
tries, technological innovations in the milling industry, new informa
tion about the health implications of bread and of rival commodities,
and so forth. Each contingent price is a well- defined number, but the
contingencies themselves are uncertain. Each actor in the economy
assigns probabilities to the alternative possible contingencies.
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Let us suppose that these contingent prices and the probabilities at
tached to the contingencies are rationally developed by the participants
in the economy. Then, if all the relevant information is publicly known,
all individuals will have the same probability judgments. This theory
may seem very general, but in fact it has striking implications for the
pricing of securities. Namely, on the best available information, the
average change will be zero (corrected for dividend payments). That
is, the price of the security tomorrow is not known today. All investors
assign the same probabilities to the different possible values of tomor
row's price. Then the average of these different possible values,
calculated using these probabilities, must be today's price. The reason
for this conclusion is that if it were not so, if there were some predic
table tendency for the price to rise from today to tomorrow on the
average, then buyers would bid up the price of the stock today and so
remove the profit opportunity.
This exposition contains in a nutshell what has come to be known
as the "rational expectations" theory of the movement of prices and
quantities over time. No doubt there is a slightly absurd aspect in assign
ing complete rationality and complete foresight within the limits of ineliminable uncertainty, a point illustrated by a parable widely repeated
among economists: Two economists are walking down the street. One
says, "Look, there's a $20 bill lying on the street," to which the other
replies, "There can't be; if there were, someone else would have already
picked it up." Nevertheless, the hypothesis that securities price changes
are unpredictable from current prices has been subject to a good deal
of empirical test. Many studies have confirmed the hypothesis very well;
others have found minor variations.
Recognizing the importance of uncertainty in forward-looking
economic behavior has led to another crucial extension of our perspec
tives, understanding information as an economic variable. Information
can be looked at broadly as any observation which changes one's pro
bability judgments. Up to this point, I have made explicitly the assump
tion that all information is public, that it is freely available to all in
dividuals equally. In fact, of course, different agents have different in
formation. Certainly, each firm, for example, knows its own produc
tion possibilities better than other firms and better than possible investors;
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similarly, consumers know their own future needs better than others
and particularly better than potential lenders to them. In a complex world
with much more knowledge than any one individual can have, knowledge
is specialized. Indeed, increasingly what workers of all kinds are sell
ing is knowledge of a kind that others do not have; physicians, lawyers,
and professors are no doubt extreme examples of what is, however,
a very widespread characteristic. But such a world is one in which dif
ferences in information not only exist but are the very reason for the
existence of economic transactions.
There are many implications of this new viewpoint. One is that prices,
particularly of securities or other assets, themselves convey informa
tion, for they reveal something of what other people know. If one in
vestor sees a rise in the price of a security for no reason known to him,
it might at first be concluded that he or she will sell. In fact, the in
vestor might be better off to infer that someone else has received
favorable news and acted on that and therefore to conclude that the securi
ty is worth more than originally thought.
There are many other implications of differing information among
economic agents. In a transaction between a less and a more informed
person, the former cannot be sure the latter is using the information
available in the former's interest. This leads to provisions in contracts
and in the nature of industrial organization which depart considerably
from the simple model of buying and selling services and goods at fix
ed prices. The new analysis has explained the many complex systems
of rewards and long-term contractual relations as responses to the
possibility of exploitation of special informational inequalities.
I have given to this point a fairly glowing picture of the success of
economic theory in grasping more realistically many aspects of the
economic relations among individuals: transactions over time, the
presence of uncertainty, and the existence of private and uncommunicated
information. I must add a sense of caution and limits to the ac
complishments, not only about the state of theory but even at the level
of fully understanding what the questions are.
It has in fact been a long-standing complaint against standard economic
theory that it depends too much on the assumption of rationality. The
complaint was raised by Thorstein Veblen, a famous dissenting
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economist at the turn of the century, against a theory of rational behavior
in circumstances much less complex than those now studied, a world
of certainty and predictability. Economic agents do not and indeed cannot
perform all the calculations demanded by the theory. To anticipate prices
rationally, they have in effect to understand a correct model of the
economy and use it to project future prices or, more precisely, what
future prices would be under a great variety of possible contingencies.
The impossibility of carrying out such calculations is manifest from
everyday observation and confirmed by the inability of economists us
ing our theory and our computing power to make good forecasts (even
good contingent forecasts). The theory of computation shows that the
necessary computations have a high degree of complexity.
In recent years, cognitive psychologists have studied the abilities of
humans to make rational choices and form probability judgments ra
tionally in experimental situations far less complex than the real
economy. Not only are the assumptions of rational behavior strongly
contradicted, but systematic kinds of bias are found. Two are of special
interest because of their potential implications for economics. One is
a tendency to overconfidence. People usually rate their own abilities
above average; obviously, this cannot be true of half of them. Thus,
the buyer of a security is not so likely to ask himself or herself what
the seller knows that motivates the sale; the buyer simply assumes his
or her superiority of understanding. A second is that choices that are
objectively the same are looked at differently according to the context,
a phenomenon known as "framing." The same outcome can usually
be thought of as a loss or a gain, depending on what the outcome is
being compared to. For example, a profit on the sale of a stock could
be thought of as a gain compared to the purchase price and a loss com
pared with what was expected or what could have been made in an alter
native investment. Rational behavior implies that these comparisons are
irrelevant to a decision to sell the stock. But a considerable body of
both experimental and field evidence in psychology implies that action
does indeed depend on framing the decision as a gain or a loss.
There are many phenomena observed in the market which can be in
terpreted to confirm lack of rationality. These are best drawn from the
securities markets, not so much because they are central to the economy
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but because they can be far better observed than other economic
phenomena, such as investments in plant and equipment. There is con
siderable evidence that stock and bond prices fluctuate far more than
is consistent with rational behavior on the part of the participants. The
theory would imply that the current price of a security is the present
value of its future returns averaged over all contingencies. Then the
price should change only as the probabilities of different contingencies
change in response to new information. But important new informa
tion is rare. The price of a given stock frequently changes by 5 percent
in a single day with no significant news about its prospects. This undue
response to small changes conforms to some generalizations found ex
perimentally by cognitive psychologists.
Another observation is the large volume of transactions on organiz
ed markets. The assumptions of rational behavior, including rationali
ty in deducing changes in the information of others from changes in
market prices, would imply that no transactions would take place simply
because of some change in the private information of some individual,
although the price would alter. Transactions would be motivated by hedg
ing or changes in other circumstances of the individual (aging or other
changes in wealth or need prospects). For example, on the foreign ex
change markets, a purchase or sale would be rational as an accompani
ment to a sale or purchase abroad, to hedge against changes in the value
of the payment. Hence the volume of transactions would be at most
equal to the volume of foreign trade. In fact, the transaction volume
is hundreds of times greater.
What can we conclude? The image of the future, cloudy though it
be, powerfully influences the current state of the economic world (and
indeed the social and political world). The formation of this image owes
something indeed to our individual and collective efforts to use our ex
perience and our preconceptions to that end. We are not without sense
and reason, but we are subject to the necessity of oversimplification
and to biases built into us. We can effectively use only part of the
knowledge that is or could be available to us. But even if we used all
we could, our prevision would be deficient because so much can hap
pen that will necessarily be a total surprise.
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An important task of economic analysis today, in conjunction with
recent work in psychology and in computer science, is to know better
how we come to acquire knowledge and form beliefs and how we act
and can act on that knowledge.
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A Nobel prize rather like James Bond's 007 appears to be a license
to have an opinion about anything. But economics was founded by Adam
Smith on the rock of the Division of Labor, and specialization is the
name of the game. So I am going to specialize on the state of
macroeconomics, mostly theoretical but with a few glances at applica
tions. Distinguished and clever economists have been heard to remark
knowingly that they understand microeconomics perfectly well and know
what they think about this or that, but do not understand macroeconomics
at all and find it a mystery. I have no patience with that ploy.
Macroeconomics is what it is all about. If you do not understand the
business cycle, unemployment, inflation, the real exchange rate, well,
you do not understand economics at all. Microeconomics is easier, of
course; it does not set itself such hard problems or aim at passing such
hard tests.
My goal is to describe the current state of macro theory and to reflect
on how it got there, its relevance for practical policy, and its possible
evolution. I would like eventually to reach some understanding of why
there is so much disagreement in public on what appear to be fundamental
issues, with equally able and eminent economists taking contradictory
positions. This situation gives rise to rude jokes and it explains, no doubt,
the occasional coy attempt to dissociate oneself from the whole
25
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embarrassing exhibition. In considering these questions I am not going
to try always to be judicious. That would be dull for all of us. I have
strong prejudices on these matters and I will express them freely, prob
ably sounding less tentative than I feel.
Debates about the fundamentals of macroeconomics usually struc
ture themselves as arguments for and against "Keynesian economics."
One reason for this formulation is that macroeconomics as we know
it really begins with Keynes and the General Theory. Before that there
was "Business Cycle Theory." Economists, like other people, observed
that there was some alternation of good times and bad times. The ques
tion arose, then: Why does it happen just that way? Business cycle theory
looked for behavior patterns and market mechanisms that could be shown
to be capable of generating and propagating cyclical fluctuations in the
whole economy. They found plenty. Some of them were interesting,
and remain interesting, just as economics is. The business cycle theory
that I learned and taught did not quite amount to macroeconomics,
however. It lacked a comprehensive theory of the determination of the
level of economic activity, a theory of "output as a whole" as Keynes
later called it. This is not a merely aesthetic complaint either. As the
Great Depression of the 1930s showed, a model of regular repetitive
cycles is not an adequate representation of the aggregate economy.
Things happen that do not lie comfortably in that sort of model.
So macroeconomics in the modern sense really dates from the General
Theory and that is one reason why it remains the focus of so much con
temporary argument. The people who wrote the first reviews were my
teachers, and some of them are still functioning today. There is an ad
ditional reason: it was a provocative book, an intentionally provocative
book, and it still provokes. It was also an undigested book, in the sense
that it contained several distinct story lines. These are not well integrated
with one another and indeed they are not always compatible with one
another. This protean character makes it a good subject for debate, not
only with its enemies but also among its avowed friends.
Eventually, maybe by some process of natural selection, an Authorized
Version evolved. It is sometimes described as "American Keynesianism," although two of its main sources were famous articles by
John Hicks and Franco Modigliani. The main components of this stan-
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dard model were and are an aggregate demand side derived from some
version of IS-LM, and a theory of the price level, sometimes anchored
in a given, inflexible, nominal wage, but not always. In practice, this
model has been used with the presumption that most of the time the
economy is operating below its potential for employment and output,
with the realized levels of employment and output determined mainly
by the demand side. For a long time the implicit belief was that the
demand side is more volatile than the supply side. That may once have
been a valid induction from history. More recent events have taught
a contrary lesson. Nowadays supply shocks get at least equal billing,
and movements of the price level and/or changes in the rate of infla
tion, and expectations about those things, play a more prominent role
than they used to. There is no need for me to provide any detail, because
you will recognize that I have described the model that is embalmed
in most elementary and intermediate textbooks of macroeconomics, and
embodied in the big complete econometric models.
The original controversy between monetarism and Keynesianism was
carried on within this framework. There were really two separate issues.
One was quite specific: it had to do with the nature of the demand for
money, especially its interest-elasticity. Within the model, this boils
down to questions about the shape and stability of the LM-curve. The
second issue was considerably broader; it had to do with the strength
of the forces pulling the aggregate economy back toward its potential
for output and employment after a disturbance. Within the model, this
boils down to questions about the flexibility of wages and prices and
their relation to employment and output. These issues are separate in
the sense that the answer to one does not determine the answer to the
other. But they are related: the first has to do with the way a monetary
shock sorts itself out between velocity and nominal demand and the sec
ond with the way a shock to nominal demand sorts itself out between
output and the price level.
There was, of course, an argument about policy lurking behind the
analytical issues. One side believed that steady growth of the money
supply (or the monetary base) was the best and only necessary
macroeconomic policy; the other believed that activist fiscal and
monetary policy could improve macroeconomic performance. It is hard
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to shake the notion that there was an ideological fire behind all that
intellectual energy. I suggested that the two analytical issues were in
principle separate. So there are four possible positions one could take,
but only two of the four boxes were ever seriously occupied.
In the past 10 or 15 years, macroeconomic theory has revolved around
a slightly different axis, though the genealogy is pretty clear. Monetarism
evolved into "new-classical" macroeconomics and American Keynesianism into something for which I have no catchy nickname. As is so
often the case with macroeconomics, theoretical developments have both
external and internal roots. They are in part a response to events out
there in the real economy, and in part a response to gaps and anomalies
that show up in the working-out of the theory itself.
The main external event was the inflation of the 1970s. I think of
it as having been set off by OPEC and raw-material inflation general
ly. Others, especially from the new-classical school, would regard that
attribution as a typically shoddy piece of Keynesian ad hockery. It is
not my job right now to analyze that inflationary episode. I am discuss
ing the recent evolution of macroeconomic thought. From that point
of view, what was important about the post-OPEC inflation was the
appearance of a major sudden economic impulse that did not originate
on the side of aggregate demand. For that reason alone there was no
ready analysis from the Keynesian consensus. The embarrassment was
compounded by the sharp role played by inflationary expectations, begin
ning with the late phases of the Vietnam War, especially expectations
about future public policy and its consequences.
Neither development, neither supply shocks nor inflationary expec
tations, is incompatible with Keynesian macroeconomics. Contemporary
textbooks like those of Dornbusch and Fischer and Gordon handle them
as a matter of course, within a framework that is recognizably AmericanKey nesian. But the consensus was caught napping, to put it mildly. It
took a while to recover. In the meanwhile, and even afterwards, the
Keynesian consensus discovered that it had no adequate policy tools
for meeting a supply-side-induced inflation compounded by entrench
ed inflationary expectations. That is perhaps not the fault of the theory;
no one else has a good policy answer either. But there is at best cold
comfort in that excuse. We had allowed ourselves to become too
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optimistic about the tightness of our analysis and our capacity to guide
the economy. The grip of the consensus was weakened.
The internal impulse that triggered and reinforced the new- classical
movement was quite different. It was the conviction that macroeconomic
theory ought to have "microeconomic foundations." I think that this
conception has been subtly misread, however. So far as I can see,
macroeconomic arguments have always been justified by an appeal to
microeconomic convention or knowledge. Just think of the way the con
sumption function and its variations are expounded in textbooks, or the
way everyone introduces the chapter on the aggregate investment func
tion by explaining the maximization of present value. The new school
insisted on something much more formal, the grounding of macroeconomic models in complete individual-agent-based microeconomic
theory. That demand certainly resonated in the profession at large. There
is nothing wrong with it in principle, but I think that it has been a blind
alley in practice.
The reason is that, in practice, the demand for micro foundations
almost had to become a demand to build macroeconomic models on
Walrasian foundations. If the felt need was for a formal connection,
if a sound macro model had to be the aggregation of a complete,
developed micro model, then Walras was all we had available off-theshelf. The trouble is that Walrasian general equilibrium theory begins
by assuming away all of the problems that make macroeconomics in
teresting. (The Elements is not a book about business cycles, after all,
but precisely the opposite.) The consequence of this historical accident
has been that much high-caliber mental effort has gone into elaborate
attempts to prove that unemployment is either nonexistent or healthy.
It will be noticed that I have not used the phrase "rational expecta
tions" to characterize new-classical macroeconomics. That is because
I think that the assumption of rational expectations is neither necessary
nor sufficient for new-classical results. What is characteristic of the
school arises even without rational expectations. It depends rather on
two other, apparently less plausible, assumptions: that all markets are
smoothly cleared by flexible prices, and that all business decisions are
merely the carrying-out of the atemporal and intertemporal wishes of
the households that own the firms. (That would account for the popularity
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of representative-agent models in this tradition.) Conversely, if you start
with, say, a Benassy-Malinvaud fixed-price model, in which markets
are foredoomed not to clear, then adding in rational expectations can
easily reinforce its Keynesian air. The main thing adding rational ex
pectations does for a modeler is to allow multiple equilibria, and that
is not especially good news for new-classicism.
A sharp version of the basic new-classical claim is that there is no
specifically macroeconomic problem distinct from the general economic
problem of scarcity. Presumably there could be, but in our world it
does not happen. What you are seeing when you look at business cycle
fluctuations is an economy adjusting optimally to exogenous real shocks
to taste and technology, to changes in the weather, for instance. (I am
describing the later version of this stance, usually called "real business
cycle theory" rather than the earlier version that was more akin to
monetarism in locating the main source of disturbance in monetary
shocks.) Thus if there are cycles, they are adaptive rather than dysfunc
tional (apart perhaps from some unavoidable noise). Of course we all
wish we were richer (i.e., more productive) and we all wish we could
predict the future better, but neither is a meaningful object of
macroeconomic policy on the business cycle time scale.
Let me be even more explicit. You are asked to believe that the real
economy behaves as if a single immortal consumer were making op
timal resource allocation decisions, intratemporally and intertemporally, constrained only by technology and available information. This
already assumes that the production economy simply responds to the
consumer's wishes. You must decide if that is a credible assertion.
I must tell you that there are no great empirical or predictive suc
cesses associated with this theory. If it said anything, it said that the
disinflation of 1979-83 would be accomplished without a recession. That
turned out to be false, of course. Is there a defense? Yes: it can be said
that the conditions for a controlled test of the theory were not met, that
the disinflationary monetary policy was not credible, for example. The
practical man's comment that we are not likely ever to get a more credible
disinflationary monetary policy can be shrugged off. The trouble is that
it is always possible to claim that the conditions for a controlled ex-
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periment have not been adequately met, so to say it in this instance is
not to say much.
New-classical macroeconomics likes to take a rather different view
of empirical verification. It prefers to set itself the task of reproducing,
at least qualitatively, the pattern of variances and covariances in observed
time series, and it pats itself on the back whenever it succeeds in doing
so to an acceptable approximation. I think this is a misleading procedure;
but the point I want to make is a general one and it applies on my own
side of the fence as well. The trouble with judging the empirical validi
ty of theories in this way is that the test almost certainly has low power
against many interesting alternatives. That is to say: many other models
of the economy can do just about as well in fitting that limited class
of facts. The conclusion is that even "success" of this kind provides
reason to accept new-classical macroeconomics only if it is preferred
for other reasons. If you find it implausible, as I do, then you are not
in the slightest obliged to accept it on its own empirical grounds. And
of course the same goes for other theories, unless they can produce em
pirical tests with considerably more discriminatory power than these.
Here, I think, is an important contribution to understanding the
widespread, perpetual, and apparently endemic disagreement that
characterizes macroeconomics to the distress of all of us. Deep down,
we all know that, as soon as we come to truly subtle questions,
econometrics does not substitute well for the controlled experiment as
a device for discriminating between competing theories. One has the
uncomfortable feeling that if you try hard enough always on subtle
and complicated matters you can find data, functional forms, statistical
techniques, lag structures, that will tell you what you want to hear.
Economics is not alone in this, by the way. A tuned-in person can see
the same thing happening with global climate models as they look for
traces of the theoretically reasonable greenhouse effect. Their problem
is much the same as ours. The questions are subtle, the data are noisy,
and there are many forces at work simultaneously.
There is a lesson here for macroeconomics, I think. To begin with,
we should stick to first-order questions and accept only robust answers,
at least when we are being serious. I have no objection to playing around,
trying things out; that is one of the ways we learn. But for public con-
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sumption, the standards should be different. Second, we are not only
entitled to use common sense and to make judgments of plausibility based
on general observation, but there is no sensible alternative to doing so.
Such conclusions are vulnerable; that goes without saying. They have
to be defended without rancor and without cant. And finally, in so do
ing, the broadest possible variety of evidence should be mobilized. There
are other roads to knowledge besides formal statistical inference. They
have to be used critically, as does formal econometrics for that matter,
but we cannot afford to dismiss any bit of information the world offers.
You will have gathered that the new-classical way of going about
macroeconomics is not my preferred way. But I would not advocate
going back to the "hydraulic" Keynesianism of the 1960s even if that
were possible. The key to doing better, I think, is to pay attention to
the "macro foundations of microeconomics." I hope I mean something
more that cuteness by that phrase: I mean, roughly, that we are entitled
to ask what sorts of microeconomic mechanisms both look right and
do justice to the nature of the general economic environment in which
they are expected to function.
There is now a self-conscious "New Keynesian Macroeconomics"
that tries to do just that. One wing of it tends to emphasize transactions
costs, information asymmetries and similar imperfections, and shows
that, in that kind of environment, the economy by itself can easily achieve
unsatisfactory states (equilibria) which might be improved by correc
tive fiscal and monetary policy. There is another strand that places greater
emphasis on imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale, and
trading externalities the tendency for optimistic (pessimistic) choices
by some to validate optimistic (pessimistic) choices by others. These
mechanisms lead to the conclusion that the economy may be capable
of many self-sustaining equilibria, some much better than others. I have
a fairly vague feeling that this second approach is on to something deeper
than the first. That feeling it is not much more than that governs my
choice of illustrative examples for non-Panglossian macroeconomics.
To start off, let me refer back to IS-LM-based American Keyne
sianism. Most of the time, as I mentioned, it rested on the hypothesis
that the nominal wage was the sticky price that kept the labor market
from clearing at full employment. (In the standard version, the price
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level for goods was taken as perfectly flexible. One of the advances
made by the Benassy-Malinvaud fixed-price literature was to enlarge
the picture by treating the goods market and the labor market more sym
metrically.) Since the nominal wage is not permanently fixed, textbooks
pointed out, and many still point out, that the nominal wage adjusts
only slowly to the state of the labor market. The model is then one of
disequilibrium, possibly prolonged. Underemployment lasts as long as
the disequilibrium lasts.
Now Keynes himself certainly believed that the nominal wage was
sticky in this sense in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s. He even sug
gested why that might be: because resistance to nominal wage cuts in
a decentralized labor market is the only way that workers can defend
their relative position in the wage structure. It is less well remembered
that0 Keynes argued that wage stickiness was probably a good thing,
that perfect wage and price flexibility could easily be destructive of real
economic stability. His reasoning went like this. In a monetary economy,
the nominal interest rate cannot be negative. Hence the real interest
rate must be at least equal to the rate of deflation. (That is what holding
cash would earn, after all.) If wages and prices were to fall freely after
a contractionary shock, the real interest rate could become very large
at just the wrong time, with adverse effects on investment. The induc
ed secondary contraction would only worsen the situation.
I can report that Frank Hahn and I have verified Keynes's intuition
within a model that is in every respect respectable. That is to say, we
can exhibit situations in which complete wage flexibility, while main
taining full employment after a shock, drives the model economy off
on completely unstable trajectories of pointlessly fluctuating output that
never return to the original steady-state equilibrium. Somewhat slower
wage adjustment would make things better, not worse. And there is
a (complicated) monetary-fiscal policy that is in principle capable of
nipping the whole process in the bud and getting over the initial shock
with minimal disturbance.
The point of this exercise is not to demonstrate the wisdom of the
Great Lama. It is much more devious. If perfect wage (and price) flex
ibility is not always the best way to run an economy, then it is perhaps
less peculiar that economies should develop institutions that limit or

34

discourage aggressive wage-cutting in times of moderate unemployment.
Hahn and I have actually produced a formal model of just that kind.
In it the labor market is modeled as a kind of repeated game involving
workers and employers. We show that there is an equilibrium strategy
for workers in which the unemployed refrain from competing for jobs,
as long as the unemployment rate is not too high. What makes this an
equilibrium strategy (i.e., one from which it pays no individual to depart
unilaterally) is the threat that any violation of the norm will lead to a
long period of unrestrained competition in the labor market. In that event
no worker does better than the reservation wage, whereas adhering to
the norm gives even currently unemployed workers the expectation of
sooner or later acquiring a job at something higher than the reservation
wage.
There is a general methodological lesson here, and it is what I am
after. The model just described has many equilibria; in fact there will
generally be a whole interval of wage rates and corresponding unemploy
ment rates, any one of which could persist if once established. (Which
one actually occurs may then be a matter of historical accident.) The
point is that this multiplicity of equilibria arises easily as soon as one
gets away from the notion that price-mediated market clearing is the
only equilibrium concept worth discussing. Noncooperative game theory
has taught us that the fundamental idea of an equilibrium is the
"strategic" definition I have used here, a choice of behavior patterns
that leaves no participant impelled to make a unilateral change. If it
seems to you, as it does to me, that the current state of the economy
could have been different I am suggesting a thought-experiment about
positions of rest, not about short-run dynamics then the idea that there
can be many self-sustaining equilibria should be your cup of tea.
The non-Panglossian branch of modern macroeconomic theory has
produced some other models that fall into this same category. Several
of them rest on an idea that goes back into business cycle theory well
before the General Theory, what I earlier called a trading externality.
It is, in far too simple terms, the notion that widespread optimism is
self-justifying, but so is widespread pessimism. Businesses and
households who are optimistic about their own market prospects will
make decisions that, taken together, create strong markets and thus
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validate their initial optimism. If they had all been pessimistic to begin
with, they would have done things that validated their initial pessimism.
If you can believe that then you believe that there are (at least) two
equilibria, a high-level one and a low-level one. It would not be too
far-fetched to think of one as prosperity and the other as recession.
Needless to say, that simple thought is not even a sketch of a sketch
of a theory. All the economics remains to be done. But it has been done,
several times in several contexts. Just by way of example, Walter P.
Heller (the son of my old leader at the Council of Economic Advisers)
has studied an economy consisting of two monopolistically competitive
industries, each of which sells only to the employees of the other. (This
artificial-sounding condition would seem quite natural if there were many
industries. It is meant to serve a reasonable purpose.) As imperfect com
petitors, each firm has to form expectations about the location of its
demand curve. In effect, then, it must form expectations about the
production and employment decisions of the other industry. The other
industry is meanwhile doing exactly the same thing. With a few unrestrictive conditions on demand-elasticities, Heller is able to show that the
optimism-pessimism story actually holds in this set-up. There can in
deed be two or more self-sustaining equilibria and it is no trick at all
to describe reasonable conditions under which the high-level equilibrium
is clearly better for everyone than the low-level one. This model has
the amusing property that the government can bring about the highlevel equilibrium simply by announcing in a convincing way that it will
do so. If the announcement is believed, the government will never ac
tually have to do anything. This economy has nothing to fear, one might
say, but fear itself.
A different and in some ways more powerful conceptualization of
the same general idea can be found in the model of' 'search equilibrium''
proposed by my colleague Peter Diamond. In Diamond's story, people
"accept productive opportunities," some of which are more advan
tageous than others, produce goods, and then look for buyers, who are
people just like themselves, having produced something to sell. Buyers
and sellers are completely symmetrical; we can call them traders. It
is better to be a trader when there are lots of traders, because then it
is easier to find a partner with whom a mutually profitable exchange
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can be carried out. If there are a lot of traders, then I will be inclined
to accept somewhat less attractive productive opportunities. Better market
prospects justify greater production. By acting like that, of course, I
add to the number of traders out there and thus justify greater produc
tion by others. Diamond is able to show that this set-up, too, is very
likely to provide two or more self-sustaining equilibria; when it does,
the ones with more output and employment are better than the ones with
less. In an added tour de force, Diamond and Fudenberg prove that
this model can even produce regular business cycles in its primitive
form of economic activity, each phase leading regularly to the next.
It is a fair criticism of the approach to macroeconomics that I have
been describing (and favoring) that it seems to produce only a collec
tion of fragments. The new-classical scheme at least produces a com
plete model that can be equipped with empirically based parameters
and simulated. Its behavior can then be checked against selected
characteristics of the world of observation. The older American Keynesianism went even further and culminated in the large econometric
models that still grind out detailed forecasts month after month. (There
are, of course, smaller models too.) The more recent shoots from the
Keynesian tree have the character of examples, illustrations of
possibilities. They are sometimes phrased in fanciful ways, as if to em
phasize that they are not intended for econometric treatment.
There are two responses to this criticism. One is simply that it will
take time to develop these newer possibilities into a form fit for em
pirical application. That may indeed be true; but it is not the response
I want to make. To my mind, the role of macro theory (even, in a sense,
applied macro theory) is not necessarily to make a single all-purpose
model to represent the world. It is certainly not unconditional forecasting.
It is rather the uncovering of mechanisms that cause the economic system
to malfunction in significant ways, and then the analysis of kinds of
policy measures, directions of policy even if not exact doses, that are
potentially therapeutic. I would resist the notion that the market failures
in question are "mere aberrations" of the system; they are the system.
Nevertheless, my sort of macroeconomics is inevitably less monolithic
than the other. This may explain the attractiveness of the new-classical
model; it looks much more like a candidate for System of the World.
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If neatness is your dominant concern, and I offer you a menu that in
cludes a whole bunch of little models, not easily put together, a certain
kind of mind will choose "None of the above" even if that answer
violates common sense.
How might this version of macroeconomics evolve? One could im
agine continued analytical study of these and other mechanisms that give
rise to occasional recessions and bursts of inflation, along with an ongo
ing attempt to evaluate their importance in the modern economy. This
effort would be partly econometric, partly institutional discussion, storytelling, educated judgment, all of those things, but I would certainly
look for rough quantification. Notice how there will be room for dif
ferences of opinion even within this paradigm. Especially if the key
concept is the multiplicity of equilibria, there will always be the em
pirical problem of characterizing the sort of equilibrium the economy
is in at the moment, and choosing the relevant model.
Perhaps I am suggesting moving away from the image of economics
as the physics of society toward the image of economics as something
more like ecology or medicine or cell biology. I am not referring to
any analogy of content, but just a view of scientific effort that is less
formal and general and reductive, and more tolerant of a variety of
models suited to a variety of problems and contexts. From that point
of view the sort of model developed so elegantly and attractively by
Lucas and Prescott is just one of many possible mechanisms; its applicaoility has to be argued anew in each concrete situation. In optimistic
moments, I think that evolution has already started.
This apparently academic subject is actually real and relevant and
contemporary. There seems to be general agreement that the probability
of a recession in the United States before the end of 1990 is something
like one-third. Suppose it happens. What will we do? What will the
Democratic Congress think is the right stance for the federal govern
ment? What will the Republican President propose? What will the con
servative but more professional Federal Reserve decide to do? Will there
be any coordination among them? And how will the argument be
conducted?
There are two main currents of thought that have their existence both
inside and outside professional economics. One is generally laissezfaire.
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It says that the unfettered private enterprise economy is well-behaved
and self-correcting. Whatever it does, however it behaves, is probably
all for the best. The optimal government policy is to get out of the way.
The recession will run its course, and anyway it is not really a reces
sion. The other main attitude says that although there is nothing basically
wrong with the free enterprise economy, there are certain areas where
it is vulnerable to market failure. Some of these are "microeconomic"
like excessive pollution or misleading labels on food and require regula
tion of some kind. But there is also macroeconomic market failure, a
tendency occasionally to lapse into recession a systemwide under
production of goods and therefore underprovision of jobs or inflation
or stagflation. That calls for compensatory stabilization policy, and
sooner is better than later.
This dichotomy does not need academic economics to keep it going.
It has deep roots in ideology and self-interest. But it is reflected in an
ongoing debate within academic economics, and especially within
macroeconomics. The debate is not in the first instance about policy
but about the correct "model of the economy." The balance of influence
shifts from time to time, partly in response to what happens in the real
world (not only in the economy but also in public opinion), and partly
in response to which side seems to have the analytical upper hand. Within
academic economics the two sides are often labeled Keynesian and antiKeynesian (currently "new-classical"). As I have explained, that is
because a great watershed in this debate which has been going on for
centuries occurred in 1936 with the publication of the first model of
the economy supporting the macro failure view ever to achieve academic
respectability. The label sticks, even if today the detailed context has
little to do with the original. Needless to say, in this typology I would
be classified as a Keynesian, for good reason.
Should any of this matter to citizens? I offer a partisan but I hope not
narrow-minded answer. When the next recession rolls around, do not
be seduced by ideology into believing that government is necessarily
part of the problem and cannot be part of the solution. Government
often is part of the problem because it is often incompetent, often
dominated by false beliefs about the world, often moved by ulterior
motives. But there is no general theoretical truth that guides you one
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way or the other. You should try to listen as impartially as you can
manage to analyses offered by economists of every persuasion, trying
to get at the picture of the world, today's world, that underlies each
diagnosis. Then you should fearlessly form judgments, fearlessly but
tentatively. Above all, you should try not to be bored.
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Conceptual Issues
Econometrics blends the disciplines of economics, mathematics, and
statistics. All too often the reciprocity of these three disciplines is
neglected. It is my feeling that an appropriate combination of all three
inputs can be extremely fruitful in gaining insight into the economy,
and that concentration on one or two alone will be less useful for this
purpose. I have spent more than 45 years looking at economic issues
through the medium of econometrics: while I do not believe that this
is the only approach, I do believe that it is the best approach for quan
tifiable matters. There are, of course, some important and interesting
philosophical, historical, and qualitative problems in economics that
do not lend themselves to the econometric method.
This essay is about the present state of macroeconomic theory and
policy as it relates to econometrics. It will be concerned with the statistical
basis for quantifying these subjects. The evolution and present state of
techniques, applications, and the information set will be examined, and
future tendencies will be indicated.
Econometrics is a broad subject, applicable to many specializations,
but I shall limit this survey to macroeconometrics the use of
41
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econometrics for the study of the macroeconomy. Econometrics is a
branch of quantitative economics, and the macroeconomic data baseparticularly the structure and availability of data is very important.

Macroeconomic Theory and Policy
Economic analysis of theory and policy are often confused, particularly
with regard to the implementation of policy in the real world. The worst
manifestation of this confusion appears in media discussions about
business, finance, and economics, but it occurs also in more serious
presentations. For example, Keynesian economics is said to be con
cerned only with deficit spending or classical economics only with finan
cial orthodoxy. It is true that Keynesian economics examines fiscal policy
and, under some conditions, advocates deficit spending, but for a very
long time Keynesians have recognized the limitations of a simplistic
approach. Classical economics does not rigidly support orthodox
monetary control for every macroeconomic deficiency.
First, we must make a distinction between theory and policy.
Macroeconomic theory involves the construction of a system of thought
that describes behavior of the economy as a whole the aggregate
economy. One approach is to build that system up from the aggrega
tion of microeconomic relationships. This approach is very attractive
but not unique. Macroeconomic relationships also may be considered
to have a life of their own and can be specified directly, without in
tricate appeal to microeconomics and the theory of aggregation. The
resulting system is also not unique, as in the "adding-up" approach.
Having established a macroeconomic theoretical framework and
specified it mathematically, we may then confront it with relevant data,
estimate the system, and use it for policy analysis. That is what
macroeconometrics is all about. The use of such empirical systems for
policy analysis results in conclusions that are very rich and encompass
many more alternatives than manipulations of fiscal deficits or money
supply alone. Such analysis need not be econometric, but noneconometricians tend to oversimplify, because they find it awkward to handle many
complex interrelationships simultaneously. It is from this oversimplifica
tion and also from expository diagrams of pedagogical treatment of the
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subject that popular writers have come to consider policy in terms of
crude stereotypes usually limited to two variables at a time.

Macroeconomic Theory
It is difficult for present-day students and research scholars to ap
preciate just how innovative the Keynesian theory of macroeconomics
was some 50 years ago, when it provided an extremely simple explana
tion of the overall levels of activity and employment that seemed to
correspond with the facts of the period. It is legitimate to criticize ear
ly practitioners for oversimplifying the relationships involving the fiscal
multiplier and overemphasizing the concept of effective demand. It soon
became clear that the Keynesian macro model needed supply and finan
cial sectors. Financial relationships of an extremely simple sort were
incorporated from the beginning, but the technological laws of produc
tion, marginal productivity, labor market clearance, and (absolute) price
determination were inadequately handled. The outcome for theory
development was that these neglected aspects were eventually incor
porated into a system that became the Keynesian-neoclassical synthesis.
That long-winded title is appropriate, since Keynes was truly a student
of Marshall and reasoned strictly along the neoclassical lines that
permeated economics in Cambridge, England. The extension of the crude
Keynesian theory along neoclassical lines was appropriate but inade
quate. There was only one price, one interest rate, and excessive ag
gregation in other markets. The explanation of workers' money illu
sion with respect to wage bargaining was contrived. In order to handle
these problems, I developed the Phillips curve for the labor market and
built larger theoretical systems that included many sectors of activity,
culminating in the Keynes-Leontief model that has a full supply side.
Aspects of income distribution and disaggregation in financial markets
were also introduced, the latter through the term structure of interest
rates and later through the analysis of the flow-of-funds accounts.
The distinction between classical economics cum monetarism and the
Keynes-Leontief-neoclassical synthesis became clear through the treat
ment of the demand for money. The monetarists base their analysis on
the a priori predictability of velocity (either a constant, simple trend,
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or function of smooth variables). The extended Keynesians argue, im
plicitly, that velocity depends on interest rates, which, we have learn
ed, can be extremely volatile.
There is one other important aspect of Keynesian economic theory
that needs to be examined. It was originally put forward as a
macroeconomic theory for a closed economy. This is most peculiar,
given Britain's deep economic involvement in the world and extreme
openness. Also, Keynes was obviously deeply concerned about inter
national economics at the time of his death, as he was one of the ar
chitects of Bretton Woods. It may have been the bad influence of North
American Keynesians, who took the lead in the theoretical develop
ment of macroeconomics and reasoned, instinctively, in closed-economy
terms. In the 1930s and the early part of the postwar period, the U.S.
economy may have been approximately closed, but that characteristic
gradually withered away. Most of the economic problems of this coun
try in the last 30 years have been predominantly or wholly international.
1 believe that it is a grave deficiency of our elementary textbooks that
they develop macroeconomics first as a self-contained explanation of
a closed system, and then add international considerations as an after
thought, much in the form of an amendment. The international prob
lems of an open economy should be introduced in the first chapter dealing
with macroeconomics and pervade the analysis in a meaningful, essen
tial way for the whole exposition. I find it unconscionable that authors
of elementary American textbooks ("Principles") have not done this
on a broad scale.
The problems that arose, in whole or in part, from crude Keynesian
theory were early fascination with the stagnation thesis, acceptance of
euthanasia of the rentier, introduction of an inflationary bias, and an
exaggerated belief in accuracy of the model. Economists frequently
generalize a few years of recent experience into decades or eras. In
the graph of interest rates, it is evident that there was a brief spell, begin
ning in the early 1930s, when short-term interest rates were low below
2 percent but they soon picked up and reached astronomical heights
in the United States. Rentiers who had the good perception to "lockin" to the high rates on long-term debt securities which yielded returns
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of 14-16 percent at the beginning of this decade realized euphoria in
stead of euthanasia.
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The long-term demographic predictions were disastrous. The vanishing
of the frontier and the maturation of technology were equally illconceived hypotheses. The baby boom, the jet engine, the spread of
electronic devices, and fluctuations in financial market rates (not to men
tion many other pieces of evidence) quickly showed that there was no
solid basis for applying the oversimplified Keynesian theory to mediumor long-run macroeconomic development.
The Keynesian theory was developed for European and North
American economies, but there was a degree of generality about the
system of thought. Some scholars may have made oversimplified ap
plications to developing countries, but, fortunately, specialists on Third-
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World development produced more appropriate systems. The KeynesLeontief model is, indeed, quite suitable for study of developing coun
tries where the data base is adequate.
The study of market-clearing and formation of relative prices by
classical economics, supplemented by the quantity theory of money,
provided the main alternative macroeconomic theory, under the title
of monetarism. Strictly speaking, monetarism deals only with the ag
gregate relationships that determine money balances (and price levels),
but implicitly it is associated with the classical model for the real
economy. From a logical point of view the theory is consistent and selfcontained, but does it work? This is an econometric question.
The fact that the builders of the St. Louis Model, a macroeconometric
version of monetarism, must introduce the world oil price in order to
get a satisfactory explanation of recent developments, indicates to me
that strict monetarism does not fit the facts. The time curve of velocity
does not exhibit steadiness or predictability, and I do find that velocity
is significantly related to interest rates. Moreover, the most recent unpredicted (by monetarists) movements in velocity are generally related
to the occurrence of financial innovation. Changes in hardware, soft
ware, and operational characteristics of financial markets have disrupted
the underlying monetarist relationships. They have a low degree of
autonomy.
Now, let us turn to the modern theory of macroeconomics. Among
most recent developments are those associated with expectations for
mation and greater attention to supply considerations. Modern
macroeconomic theory appears to be well aware of international dimen
sions, but the treatment has not yet reached the level of introductory
textbooks.
In general, there is much more attachment to market processes, but
that is mainly a matter of degree. If the Keynes-Leontief-neoclassical
synthesis is fully pursued, all the supply-side characteristics are covered.
While I endorse this approach, I reach the conclusion that a full realiza
tion of the power and implications of such a system must necessarily
lead us to the realm of very large-scale models, with hundreds and
more likely thousands of simultaneous relationships. Such intricate
structures can only be handled by computer analysis of large-scale em-
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pirical models. The modern generation, however, appears to be mov
ing in another direction, namely, towards very compact, simplified
systems. To some extent, they reason according to a law of parsimony.
The smallest system capable of explaining the facts of life is the one
to be chosen. The problem with this reasoning is that the "facts of life"
are very narrowly prescribed. Little attention is paid to a very wide
range of facts, especially potential future events that are not present at
the time of the investigations. They are not ready for embargoes,
droughts, OPEC power, financial innovation, debt default, or other con
tingencies. In place of the rule of parsimony, my preference is for:
the largest system that can be managed, given human and
data resource limitations, and one that provides estimates of
the main aggregates at least as good as those from any smaller
system, since it also gives information on many other
magnitudes.
Apart from using smaller systems with less comprehensive coverage
of detail and less attention to the intricacies of the data problem, modern
macroeconomic theory pays a great deal of attention to expectations.
On the surface this is eminently desirable and potentially constructive.
Expectations have for years and years been the subject of copious
research in macroeconomic theory. Keynes devoted an entire and
insightful chapter to the subject. 2 G. L. S. Shackle, who admired the
Keynesian theory, wrote a book on the subject in order to advance
knowledge by building on established lines. 3 Macroeconomic analyses
of wage flexibility, especially in recessionary conditions, used implicit
reasoning about expectations to refute the reliance on this feature of
the labor market to guarantee return to full-employment equilibrium
when the economy was deflected from that state. Macroeconometric
modeling always relied heavily on the use of expectations, and results
from sample surveys of households and firms were consistently brought
to bear on the measurement of expectations.
Modern theorists then turned to own-model-generated expectations,
misleadingly called rational expectations, to generate results by a purely
hypothetical intellectual process without even considering whether they
have any behavioral meaning. From a statistical point of view, they
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require the unknown model to provide estimates of expectations data
based on parameter estimates that also depend on the expectations data.
They surely overwork the sample, asking it to provide both the extra
data needed and the parameter estimates based on those data.
The estimates can be computed, if the model is identified, which is
not always the case, but the estimates may not even be unique. 4 Models
that are so estimated give different response characteristics, in general,
but they have not been tested to see if they provide more accurate ex
trapolations than mainstream models. I doubt that forecast tests will
show that such different models are superior. Direct empirical tests of
so-called rational expectations are not kind to the concept; adaptive ex
pectations appear to stand up better to the data. 5
An advocate of own-model-generated expectations is R. Lucas, who
has argued on occasion that economic decisionmakers and policymaking authorities will be using the same model and coming to the same
conclusion about expected values; therefore policies set by the latter
will already have been taken into account by the former, thus making
policy interventions futile. There are many arguments against this view
besides the unreality of own-model-generated expectations. Models differ
widely among the population, and noise elements obscure common
signals.
In another line of argument, Lucas asserts (without testing) that
parameters in macroeconomic models are functions of policy in
struments: when instruments are changed, people's reactions will
automatically change and possibly negate the intended changes sought
by the policy makers. Of course, variable parameters have long been
investigated in macroeconomic models. Either they contribute to
nonlinearities, which can be unfolded back to stable parameters, or they
are random parameters, or they vary according to a wide range of fac
tors that are not necessarily closely related to policy instruments.
Lucas' approach is a contrived theory that is known, in advance, to
recommend noninterventionism. It is not known, however, to be related
at all to the actual formation of expectations.
A difficulty with the modern approach is that if it does not automatical
ly make policy intervention futile, it does make it very indefinite depend
ing on just how the expectations are generated by the own-model.
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A verifiable theory of expectations can, however, be measured,
estimated for model use, and studied for policy response that turns out
to be more definite, apart from the fact that the findings are subject
to error and should be surrounded by confidence intervals.

Macroeconomic Policy
Keynesian macroeconomic theory was originally developed as a basis
for policy intervention to save the Western market economies that had
lapsed into severe recession in the late 1920s and 1930s. Apart from
the ill-considered stagnation thesis and other longer-range perspectives,
the theory was reasonably well conceived for the recovery policies pro
moted through fiscal stimuli. Classical-minded economists warned
against inflation, but that concern was not actually realized until the
major economies had recovered to high employment levels for a sus
tained period during the reconstruction phase after the Second World
War. Both tax and expenditure policies were actively used, and monetary
policy was introduced as interest rates were allowed or encouraged to
rise. An early bias in favor of fiscal rather than monetary policy for
stabilization, among Keynesians, was soon abandoned, and both were
used in tandem. In addition, econometric simulation of models soon
gave evidence that fiscal policy needed to be accommodated by monetary
policy; otherwise a fiscal stimulus or restraint would peter out or turn
perverse. There was no problem among neo-Keynesian theoreticians
and econometricians in developing the analysis in this direction and seek
ing balanced policies in which fiscal and monetary policies reinforce
each other.
Just as there was little concern about inflation as long as there was
significant excess supply during the 1930s, there was little concern about
international economic affairs particularly exchange-rate movements
as long as the Bretton Woods agreements were in effect during the 1950s
and 1960s. Inflation and flooding the world with dollars as a result of
poor policy implementation of Vietnam War finance caused the Bret
ton Woods system of fixed parities to break down. During the 1970s,
policymakers had to cope with supply-side shocks from food and fuel
prices, general inflation, and fluctuating exchange rates. A major policy
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prescription was to control inflation through the use of social contractsincomes policies. Here we came to a standoff in terms of economic
analysis of policy. The monetarists argued that strict control of the money
supply was the only way to deal with inflation, while many Keynesians
argued for incomes policies.
Monetarists argued that incomes policies never worked, and, at the
end of the 1970s, policies of orthodox monetary tightening were adopted,
both in the United States and in Europe in Germany on the continent,
and in Britain. It should be noted that Austria had successfully used
an incomes policy and held inflation in check while growing nicely. 6
Monetarism prevailed and brought down inflation, but the cost was
very high. The world went through the severest recession of the postwar
period. Apart from the fact that incomes policies were not given a prop
er trial, the blunt application of monetarist policy failed to give ap
propriate note to the decline in commodity prices that began in 1981-82.
The United States and other countries had adjusted to the change in
the terms of trade for energy. Conservation was impressive, new
discoveries were made, and interfuel substitution relieved many short
ages. These developments started to break the power of OPEC. Grain
supplies became ample and commodity prices, besides fuel and food,
leveled off or declined. Belatedly, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
and Federal Reserve governors recognized that inflation is closely related
to world commodity price movements, but not in time to save the world
from overkill in 1981-82. 7
Economic policy in the 1970s and 1980s became much more marketoriented. Economists became conservative, turning away from interven
tion, along the lines of Lucas and the monetarists, and towards deregula
tion. The point was repeatedly made that the market process led to bet
ter judgments than could be implemented by government policy makers.
This stalled and eventually killed an effective energy policy. It was us
ed as an argument against industrial policy, which had been so suc
cessful in the expansion of the Japanese economy during the 1960s.
In general, the economics profession rejected indicative planning or in
dustrial policy and argued for deregulation. There was near-complete
deregulation of airlines and partial deregulation in the financial sector,
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particularly in banking. While there have been some impressive gains
from deregulation, there also have been some very serious side effects.
A lax attitude towards regulation, encouragement of deregulation, and
implicit faith in the power of the market have contributed to a severely
weakened financial sector, hundreds of bank failures, excessive activi
ty in mergers and acquisitions, large debt structures to burden corpora
tions, and an atmosphere that culminated in Black Monday (October
19, 1987).
It is not difficult to see why politicians might be willing to take risks
and expose the economy to increased variability and fluctuation. They
come and go, according to voter preference, but it is not easy for me
to understand why professional economists have become so tolerant of
policies that lead to social risk.
The macroeconomy is presently functioning well in terms of GNP
growth, unemployment, inflation and other indicators. The laity and
politicians claim that it is, in fact, a period of prosperity. But the economy
has reached this position amid serious problems the internal and ex
ternal deficits, widely fluctuating exchange rates, an exposed banking
system, debt burdening some of our most important trading partners
in the Third World, and high-level unemployment in Europe. These
foreign problems loom large for us because the United States is so in
volved in the world economy. In making projections of the ability of
our government to overcome the internal fiscal deficit position, steady
growth at a modest level is assumed to occur, year after year, as though
the business cycle had been outlawed. Such presumptions have proved
to be disastrous in the past, yet economist advisors to policymakers are
loathe to forecast cyclical downturns, in spite of the fact that they have
occurred with a fair degree of regularity for more than 100 years.
Keynesian macroeconomic theory was designed to deal with a cyclical
depression, and dynamic extensions of the theory generated regular
cycles. It was recognized at an early stage that credible forecasts would
have to be made in order to implement the theory's policy recommen
dations. The forecasting techniques are difficult, frustrating, and tedious,
so much so that practitioners frequently give up and profess to "feel
their way" blindly in reacting to events. I agree that forecasting is dif-
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ficult, but I feel that it cannot be avoided. The reactive procedure will
consistently be too slow to be effective. Both contemporary policy (one
year or shorter horizon) and medium-term policy (up to 10 years ahead)
require a forward look in order to make policy fit the factual situation
when it is realized. It is true that unreliability remains, but econometric
forecasting methods are our only tools, and they do work at least as
well as personal judgment. In the short run, they provide fairly accurate
guidelines. In the longer run, two procedures come to our assistance.
Rolling forecasts should be made for the medium-term horizon. Every
quarter or year, forecasters should update a new look-ahead for an ex
tended horizon. The medium-term outlook will change, but this pro
cedure should enable policymakers to stay in touch with the changing
situation.
Naturally, the further ahead one tries to forecast, the less certain is
the point forecast. The error band may grow substantially enough to
discourage the policymaker but all economic choices must be made
in an environment disturbed by "noise" in the economy. The situation
can be made more manageable by discounting both the point projec
tion and the error or confidence bands back to the present. If the dis
count factor is, let us say, 10 percent and if the error bands grow no
faster than 10 percent annually, the margin of uncertainty can be restrain
ed to a manageable interval that is not so large as to render the
policymaker uncomfortable.
Will economic forecasts ever improve? Paul Samuelson once remarked
that we have perhaps reached the asymptotic level of precision that we
can expect to attain. 8 This may be true, but Stephen McNees has in
dicated that the precision of macroeconometric forecasts has gradually
improved between the 1950s and 1980s, with a detour during the tur
bulent 1970s. 9 No other systematic study over such a long time has ever
been made, but the record for macroeconometric forecasts does look
promising; that is another reason why I say that this is our only tool.
We have tried using sample surveys, quarterly instead of annual data,
time series models (ARIMA or VAR), but nothing has shown the decisive
power of a breakthrough. I do not think that models with own-generated
expectations will produce impressive results. There is, however, seme
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hope in this information age. The use of high-frequency data, which
are becoming plentiful at daily, weekly, and monthly intervals, looks
promising. There is inherently much serial dependence in economic data,
and this can be exploited for short-run forecasts, from one to six months
ahead. These short-run forecasts can then be used to calibrate or adjust
quarterly econometric models of the economy as a whole. An objec
tively adjusted model that combines time series information at high fre
quency with the customary frequency of prevailing models may well
lead to significant improvement of forecasts. 10 Further use of sample
survey information in connection with modeling may enhance such im
provements. This is the most promising lead at the moment for improving
economic forecasts and making policy formation sounder.
I noted earlier that the Keynesian theoretical model was fully com
patible with both monetary and fiscal policy, although early on there
was an emphasis on fiscal policy. By contrast, classical monetarism
would rely exclusively on monetary policy and use the tax system simply
to collect enough revenue to pay for necessary government expenditures,
which, according to their tastes, should be as small as possible.
The Keynesian mixture of monetary and fiscal policy should aim for
balance. In this way the economy is not disturbed, and the burden of
macroeconomic adjustment is equitably distributed.
At the beginning of the 1980s a new brand of economic policy came
on the scene, labeled "supply-side economics." The theoretical base
for this policy was simply conventional, neoclassical economics. The
theoretical base was not at fault, but it was carelessly applied to the
problems at hand. Proponents claimed that if tax rates were lowered,
there would be a surge of activity that would bring in more taxes and
keep fiscal policy in budgetary balance. On the supply side it was argued
that people would save more and work harder if marginal tax rates were
lowered. Another aspect of this brand of supply-side economics was
the assertion that deregulation would improve economic efficiency. The
end result of supply-side fiscal policies would be to avoid a recession
and implement an anti-inflation program. As a novel theory for ac
complishing all these fine macroeconomic objectives, this populist type
of supply-side economics has been fully discredited. Savings did not
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rise; federal budgets were not balanced; productivity did not improve
more than usual; and, as was mentioned already, the quality of
deregulated services deteriorated so much so that financial services'
activity nearly brought on a world crisis of enormous dimensions.
Another consequence of ill-considered applications of supply- side
economics was that policy became seriously unbalanced. The strong
reduction in tax rates created such a fiscal deficit that monetary policy
was the only viable tool for maintaining economic order. This pressure
on the application of monetary policy led to extremely high interest rates,
which imposed a severe burden on the housing market and on borrowers
in the developing world, not to mention bank lenders both abroad and
at home particularly in sensitive markets such as Oklahoma, Texas,
and California.
These unbalanced policies induced a recovery from the recession,
and the ensuing deficits were so large that the ordinary Keynesian
stimulus of deficit spending led the U.S. economy into a decent revival
in the real sector. Financial sectors remained in disarray in the aftermath.
Macroeconometric methods monitored this policy path quite well;
that is why Stephen McNees' findings show improved forecasts in the
1980s. These methods also indicated at the very beginning that tax coef
ficients associated with saving, labor supply, and investment would not
be strong enough to bring about the gains being sought for savings and
work effort.
The deregulation aspect of supply-side economics, as it is being prac
ticed, relies increasingly on the market mechanism. This is not necessary
for emphasis on the supply side, for industrial policy provides a supplyside approach to policy, without being free-market-oriented. Similar
ly, the structure of centrally planned and developing economies focuses
on the supply side, but the presence or absence of free markets is ir
relevant. In their treatment of the debt problem in the Third World,
U.S. authorities since 1980 have tied concessionary treatment to the
ideology of free-market economics. Although this approach has not yet
been successful, many economists support the free-market emphasis.
In official negotiations with centrally planned economies in Europe
and Asia, both the United States and other Western countries have strong-
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ly supported economic reforms that introduce more market mechanisms.
These events have much to do with political economy, but they are also
related to the subject of this paper, namely, developments in
macroeconometrics. Macroeconometric model building is very much
alive in China and is used to throw light on the reform process. It is
also used in Eastern Europe especially in Poland and Hungary
although the effort there is academic rather than oriented towards of
ficial policy. The macroeconometric modeling of the USSR was original
ly done in the United States and Japan, but it does seem to be gaining
ground now in the Soviet Union as a result of reform efforts. 11
These models track the economy well and show the inflationary
pressures. In North America and Europe, as well as in Japan, Australia,
and New Zealand, the paradigm model is in the IS-LM framework,
with the usual challenges from the monetarist side. Small macro models
can be constructed directly from aggregative data to produce IS-LM
graphics, or large scale models can be reduced to maquettes that show
the same kinds of core features. It is my contention that in a statistical
context, the IS-LM paradigm crowds out the monetarist paradigm for
industrial countries. 12
It is difficult to specify the corresponding paradigm for the centrally
planned or developing economy, but it does appear that the two-gap
model shows great promise. Chinese colleagues have succeeded in con
structing small two-gap econometric models of China. This is interesting
because China covers, simultaneously, the centrally planned and the
developing country cases. Oddly enough, the two-gap model with a
monetarist-type equation for price-level determination seems to fit the
Chinese data very well and deal with the present tendency towards high
inflation rates. This paradigm can be used to analyze Chinese economic
policy by showing the effects of importing, exporting, and exploiting
technical progress for growth. It could be extended to deal with such
financial matters as foreign-exchange-reserve position, debt-service
burden, and other problems related to financial capital flows. Model
building was feasible in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe before
the onset of price reform. Technological relationships, choice subject
to given prices, and foreign trade fit well into regular statistical patterns,
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but liberalization in Hungary opened the way for more extensive
macroeconometric work. Under perestroika this development should
be accelerated. Since 1978, China has been liberalizing, producing more
meaningful data, and starting to construct usable models. Early ver
sions were built by Lawrence Lau, but by now Chinese econometricians have acquired the capability, and macroeconometric models of
China are likely to be as much in evidence as those of Ppland, Hungary,
and Yugoslavia. Since many of the China models will be built in state
agencies, they will have the potential for use in macroeconomic policy
formation.

Some Methodological Developments
There are two modern tendencies in macroeconometrics. One is the
fascination of a younger generation with model-consistent expectations,
that is, expected values are generated by the very models that are being
estimated. This is being done on a large scale, but we have yet to see
how such values stand up under the stern test of forecasting ability.
They have no "track-record," and this must be established in order
to gain credibility. Many U.K. models now have model-generated ex
pectations and will eventually build up a track record.
A second tendency is to turn to time series analysis without much
input from economics. I stressed earlier that econometrics is based on
three disciplines, one of which is economics. When Tjalling Koopmans
wrote his celebrated review of Burns and Mitchell's treatise on business
cycle analysis, he meant by "theory" both economic and statistical
theory. 13 The modern reliance on time series analysis leans heavily on
statistical theory but is nearly empty in the field of economics.
Time series analysis can be interesting in searching for and describ
ing relationships or hypotheses about the macroeconomy, but it is
awkward to apply this methodology to scenario or policy analysis. The
VAR versions assume that all variables are endogenous. How well will
this kind of theoretical specification serve us when there is an oil em
bargo or similar supply-side shock? Will it survive an event like the
breakdown of Bretton Woods? This is not to say that the mainstream
structural model can foresee such momentous events, but once an event
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occurs, the structural model is readily capable of analyzing its effects.
Structural model builders in macroeconometrics should not ignore
the powerful contributions of time series analysis, but they should not
replace structural models by pure empirical analysis. The combination
of high-frequency time series analysis with mainstream structural quarter
ly models, cited above, is but one way of combining time series with
structural models. In fact, E. Philip Howrey of the Michigan Model
group recommends forming a weighted average of a small monthly
(VAR) time series model with a structural (Michigan) econometric
model. There are other fruitful possibilities for drawing on time series
analysis, such as the updating of parameter estimates as a sample evolves
through time.

Concluding Remarks
Early in my professional career, I was impatient with the resistance
to the introduction of Keynesian macroeconomics. I also enjoyed con
frontation with established nonmathematical economists who resisted
the introduction of mathematical methods and econometrics for the study
of our subject. Eventually, the quantitative approach triumphed, and
econometrics cum mathematical economics became common practice.
I feel uncomfortable now resisting some changes in macroecon
ometrics. Much of the new work is very good, although I find it hard
to perceive a true breakthrough in the vast volume of research material
that is being published. My problem is with the sterility of those aspects
that have become very popular and enthrall young, fertile, productive
minds without offering clear advancement of the science.
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I am pleased and honored to participate once again in this valuable
series, and I congratulate the University and my hosts on its 25th birth
day. The topic this year is very broad. I shall confine myself to the
area of my greatest interest and experience, macroeconomic theory.
It happens also to be the arena of the liveliest controversies over substance
and methodology during the past 20 years. I suspect that the revolu
tions or counterrevolutions in macroeconomics may be the principal
reasons that the organizers of this series invited the speakers to com
ment on the present state of economic science.
Even macroeconomic theory is too general for one essay. After a brief
methodological introduction, I shall narrow my focus to a specific
substantive issue, to what in my opinion is the fundamental issue of
macroeconomics: the existence, reliability, strength, and speed of ad
justments by which a market economy maintains or restores
economy wide equilibrium between the supplies of labor and of the prod
ucts of labor and the demands for those services and goods. A half cen
tury ago, during the Great Depression, intense debate on this issue split
the economics profession between John Maynard Keynes and the revolu
tionaries he inspired, on the one side, and the defenders of established
orthodoxy, on the other. Today the same battle is rejoined, and the same
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ground is contested with more powerful ammunition. Those who, like
me, were young rebels in the 1930s are now, as this essay will make
all too clear, on the defensive. Whatever you may think about the merits
of the controversy, you may find it interesting to relate the new debate
to the old one on the same issue.
I begin with a general discussion of methodologies, old and new, in
macroeconomics.
The "Micro Foundations" Methodology
of Modern Macroeconomics
Macroeconomics has been a distinct field in economic theory only
since Keynes's 1936 book, The General Theory ofEmployment, Interest
and Money. The word "macroeconomics" itself, adopted to distinguish
the study of economies as a whole from the study of households,
businesses, markets, and sectors, "microeconomics," is of even more
recent vintage. The central paradigm of economic theory begins with
"micro" as the calculus of rational self-interested behavior by individual
decisionmakers. They determine their supplies of and demands for
multitudes of commodities by maximizing their incomes of their utilities
subject to the constraints of their resources. Competitive markets coor
dinate their choices, balancing demands for all commodities with sup
plies. Prices adjust to clear all markets. Through the responses of ra
tional economic agents to these price signals, markets transmute micro
selfishness and myopia into optimal social allocations of resources as
if by an' 'invisible hand,'' to quote the famous metaphor of Adam Smith.
The theory of general equilibrium, perhaps the most impressive intellec
tual structure in social science, gives rigorous content to Smith's in
tuitive conjecture. It purports to build the whole economy from the
behaviors of individual agents. But it is a framework of analysis, rather
than a source of specific conclusions about the signs and magnitudes
of relationships among economic variables e.g., price and income ef
fects on demands and supplies or effects of taxes on prices and quantities.
The shortcuts and simplifications of macroeconomics were and are
the inevitable costs of getting interesting and testable propositions, of
which full-blown general equilibrium theory is virtually empty. From
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Keynes on, macro model builders relied on the standard paradigms of
neoclassical theories of the behavior of individual agents in specifying
their behavioral equations. But Keynes and his successors had to use
information and hypotheses about behavior other than the implications
of optimization theory. They could appeal to empirical observation, or
to hunches about plausibility, to place restrictions on individual
behaviors. Moreover, aggregate relationships are the results of diverse
behaviors of multitudes of individual agents; a structural macro equa
tion combines assumptions about individual behavior and assumptions
about aggregation. Macro modelers also inject realism about the in
stitutions and economic structures of the economies they are describ
ing. Those economies did not, do not, conform to the assumptions of
highbrow general equilibrium, for example, perfect and complete com
petitive markets.
Pure theorists naturally found macro models aesthetically unappeal
ing and intellectually confusing. They criticized macro relationships as
ad hoc because they were not explicitly derived from "first principles,"
i.e., from optimizations by individual decisionmakers. "Micro Foun
dations!" was the rallying cry of the methodological counterrevolution
against Keynesian economics, really against all macroeconomics. Its
protagonists complained of the absence of explicit derivations of macro
behavioral equations from optimization; they proposed to build a new
macro solidly and clearly based on individual rationality. Only rela
tionships with those micro foundations, they said, could be expected
to be stable over the range of applications not just forecasts but also
conditional estimates of the effects of policy interventions and other
exogenous variations to which macroeconomics aspires. This view
point has swept the profession.
After 15 or 20 years of methodological counterrevolution, where do
we stand? ' 'What you gain on the swings you lose on the roundabouts.''
Aggregation is a tough problem, so it is just finessed. It is easy to display
explicit micro foundations when you assume the whole private economy
can be represented as one agent, Robinson Crusoe, or as two who dif
fer only in age and endowment, operating in competitive markets with
flexible prices. But of course there are no transactions in these markets
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(except in the overlapping generations model once every two-period
lifetime). The immense volumes of transactions we actually observe
in markets for assets and commodities are simply not explained. No
heed is paid to all the problems of coordination and communication which
concerned Keynes and other macro theorists the differences between
savers and investors, lenders and borrowers, bulls and bears, risk-lovers
and risk-averters, and so on.
Why the "representative agent" Robinson Crusoe is a less ad hoc
and more defensible simplification than the dirty constructs of earlier
macro modelers, and of today's macroeconometricians, is beyond me.
I note some biases to which this methodology leads. The single-agent
abstraction makes social welfare identical with the welfare of the in
dividual agent. It excludes by definition any discrepancies between in
dividual and social optima, in particular the deadweight losses due to
involuntary unemployment, the market failure that motivated
macroeconomics at its origins 50 years ago. The methodology treats
government as an alien player in a two-person game with the an
thropomorphic private sector, a game in which the government in
comprehensibly tries to throw the private sector off its optimal solu
tion while the private agent tries to outwit the evil or idiot policy maker.
These biases work in a conservative and Panglossian direction.
I exaggerate. An increasing number of theoretical papers using the
new methodology attempt to model setups in which things do not work
out for the best and in which government may even play some beneficent
ly corrective role. I note, however, that this role is seldom a Keynesian one, because the distortion the government can correct is seldom
a failure of markets to clear. Moreover, because of the methodology
those papers are, like the ones that glorify the invisible hand, logical
exercises rather than models that seriously try to describe real-world
economies.
Even the individual's optimization problem is simplified and specializ
ed in the interests of analytic tractability. Utility and production func
tions take parametric forms. By convention, equations are linear or log
linear or are so approximated. The whole point of "micro foundations"
is to find stable relationships that survive policy variations, exogenous
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shocks, and the passage of time. But we have no basis for empirical
confidence that an individual's utility function, for example, remains
the same over her life, independently of her actual experience and en
vironment. We certainly have no basis for assuming a utility function
with a constant rate of relative risk aversion as a stable basis for both
intertemporal choices and choices involving risk.
In journals, seminars, conferences, and classrooms, macroeconomic
discussion has become a babble of parables. A macro theorist has become
a story-teller who constructs a mythical economy in which institutions
and environments conspire so that rational behavior in price-cleared
markets comes up with observable outcomes that in one or two respects
conform to stylized facts of the real world. In other respects, however,
there is no resemblance of the mythical economy to the real world. Con
sequently there is a big gulf between academic macroeconomics and
the macroeconomics oriented to contemporary events and policies.
Price Rigidity—The Essential Basis of Keynesian Macroeconomics?
Keynesian economics, at least old'fashioned Keynesian economics,
is almost always described afc dfc endent on nominal price rigidity. (The
word "price" may be interpreted generically, to include nominal wage
rates.) Whether the crucial rigidity characterizes labor markets or pro
duct markets or both is an interesting but secondary issue. In any case,
nominal price rigidity is said to be necessary to enable monetary policies
and other nominal macroeconomic shocks to affect real aggregate de
mand, in particular to cause real aggregate demand to deviate downward
from real aggregate supply.
I could document the prevalence of this interpretation of Keynesian
economics by quoting from textbooks, old and new, Keynesian and antiKey nesian. I prefer to quote from a recent paper by three young stars
of the American economics profession:
In the early 1980s, the Keynesian view of business cycles
was in trouble. The problem was not new empirical evidence
against Keynesian theories, but weakness in the theories
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themselves. According to the Keynesian view, fluctuations
in output arise largely from fluctuations in nominal aggregate
demand. These changes in demand have real effects because
nominal prices and wages are rigid. But in Keynesian models
of the 1970s, the crucial nominal rigidities were assumed
rather than explained assumed directly, as in disequilibrium
models, or introduced through theoretically arbitrary assump
tions about labor contracts. Indeed it was clearly in the in
terests of agents to eliminate the rigidities they were assum
ed to create. . . . Thus the 1970s and early 1980s saw many
economists turn away from Keynesian theories and toward
new classical models with flexible wages and prices. 1
I quote from this paper because the authors profess sympathy for
Keynesian economics and propose to overcome its theoretical flaws by
deriving rigidities from "micro foundations," that is, from rational op
timizing behaviors of individuals. They style themselves "New Keynesians."
These writers, and many others of their generation, accept the
methodology of the neoclassical counterrevolution, but they are impress
ed by the evidence that Keynesian macroeconomics fits empirical obser
vations better than new classical business cycle theories. After all, Keyne
sian economics was originally inspired by the Great Depression, for
which the orthodoxies of the day had no explanations and no remedies.
I believe that the depth and duration of the two most recent recessions,
1974-75 and 1979-82 (longer in Europe), have similarly helped to
discredit the revival of these classical orthodoxies a half century later.
Laudable though the New Keynesians' research program is, I shall
argue that it is misguided. It is based on a misunderstanding of Keynes
himself and of old Keynesian economics. The New Keynesians have
accepted the terms of the debate formulated by the anti-Keynesian "newclassical" counterrevolutionaries. Both sides of the contemporary debate
misrepresent and exaggerate the role of price rigidity and of nominal
(as opposed to real) demand shocks in Keynesian macroeconomics.
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Do Flexible Prices Fully Absorb Demand Shocks Instantaneously?
First, John Maynard Keynes, in his General Theory, did not postulate
price rigidity, or even, money wage rigidity, in the ordinary common
sense meaning of the word. It is true that some teachers and some writers
of elementary textbooks drew backward L's in output/price space or
employment/money-wage space. The wage or price is constant below
full employment or fiill employment output. At those values aggregate
labor and product supplies become perfectly inelastic, vertical in those
diagrams. The General Theory, Book V, says that price will rise relative
to money wage as output and employment increase, because the real
wage follows marginal productivity down. (In postulating diminishing
marginal productivity and countercyclicality of real wage rates, Keynes
was leaning over backwards to be classical. The proposition was
challenged on empirical grounds almost immediately. Keynes accepted
the criticism and observed correctly that his general case was strengthen
ed if expansion could occur without declines in real wages.) The same
Book V anticipates that the money wage itself will rise as aggregate
employment approaches full employment.
What is true is that Keynes and Keynesians did not expect the ag
gregate supply curve, plotting price against real output, to be vertical
within the short run for which the Keynesian model applies. That short
run they surely regarded as conditioned by the price and wage deter
mined in previous periods.
Keynes and Keynesians used what Sir John Hicks has called thefixprice method as an expository device. The calculus of effective
demand spending propensities and multipliers was a major innovative
contribution of Keynesian economics, anticipating by 30 years the "dise
quilibrium economics" of Barro and Grossman and of the French school,
Benassy, Grandmont, and Malinvaud. The variables in this calculus are
real quantities, output flows and their components. It was convenient
to keep effects on and of prices to one side during the exposition, and
it was valid so long as prices were not completely and instantaneously
clearing markets. This expository device, taken literally, doubtless con
tributed to the mistaken impression that absolute rigidity of prices was
a necessary assumption.
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The second point is more basic. The critics of Keynesian theory,
friendly new Keynesians as well as hostile new classicals, take it for
granted that if prices were flexible that is, not rigid as they allege
Keynes assumed then there could be no departure at all from the real
equilibrium, no departure even in the shortest run. Flexible prices would
instantaneously and continuously clear all markets, for products, labor,
and financial instruments. No involuntary unemployment could ever
arise, no undesired excess capacity, no gap between actual and poten
tial GNP.
The formal story is that the Walrasian Auctioneer receives all the
multicommodity supply and demand schedules of the agents, including
those of the monetary authority and other policy makers. These schedules
refer to intertemporal as well as contemporaneous contracts and tran
sactions. The Auctioneer, presumably using a super-computer yet to
be designed and built, solves the equation system, generates the marketclearing price vector, and informs the participating agents of the tran
sactions they have made at those prices. The next day, or the next hour,
or really the next microsecond, the awesome feat is performed anew.
In this interpretation, flexibility of prices in response to shocks, and
in response to news, occurs instantaneously. Prices jump to their new
market-clearing values discontinuously, without the passage of clock
time. A graph of a price time series would show discontinuities. This is
certainly not what is meant by flexibility in common parlance. And
it certainly does not take anything like rigidity in the common meaning
of that word to believe that demand shocks will cause output to deviate,
at least temporarily, from the "AS" schedule.
Anyway, if imperfect or monopolistic competition is assumed, rather
than Walrasian pure competition, a Walrasian Auctioneer solution would
not even exist.
Fifty years ago, no economists denied that demand shocks could at
least temporarily affect output, in individual markets and in the economy
at large. Keynes did not regard this possibility as problematic, and neither
did his "classical" opponents. No one took the continuous competitive
multimarket-clearing scenario as anything but an illustrative demonstra
tion that in principle the system was self-consistent and solvable. As
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Joseph Schumpeter, a great economist at whose feet I sat, put it, Walras's
theory was the magna charta of economists, giving us the license to
proceed in the knowledge that our quest for coherence was not a fruitless
one. It was the beginning of the search, not the end. It was not then,
as it seems to be now in theoretical circles, a point of reference from
which any alleged departure bears the burden of proof. That is a Panglossian presumption, biasing our profession to the view that free markets
are the best of all possible worlds.
Fifty years ago, and earlier, price theorists worried about false trading.
Walras and Marshall envisaged temporary disequilibria in individual
markets. Prevailing prices do not always clear the markets. They
postulated dynamic rules of price adjustment (Walras) or quantity ad
justment (Marshall) that would normally, but not invariably, bring supply
and demand together. Stability of general multimarket equilibrium was
especially problematic. "False trading" was recognized as a possible
source of prolonged disequilibrium. Trades made at nonmarket-clearing
prices change the endowments of the market participants, and thus alter
their supply and demand schedules. A fashionable current term for ef
fects of this kind is "hysteresis," a generic name for situations in which
the nature of a system's equilibrium is not independent of the path the
system takes when it is out of equilibrium. These problems have not
been solved by later generations of theorists. They have simply been
ignored, and replaced by firmer reliance on the great Auctioneer.
False trading and similar phenomena make it difficult for agents to
learn the structure of the markets in which they are participating ac
curately enough to form rational expectations. The observations
generated by disequilibria cannot teach the participants the equilibrium
structure. Imagine a group of non-English-speaking foreigners from all
over the world trying to learn English simply by conversing with each
other.
Fifty years ago, the macroeconomic disagreement between Keynesians and classicals concerned this point. A shock occurs and takes the
economy away from equilibrium. Unemployment arises, Keynesian in
voluntary unemployment. Would endogenous movements of prices and
other macroeconomic variables return the economy to the equilibrium
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from which it was jarred? Does the capitalist-market economy have
reliable and quick mechanisms of adjustment?
The classical economists thought there were effective stabilizers.
Keynes thought there were not. Sometimes, on some pages, he argued
that there were none at all. In Book I of his General Theory, he en
visages a whole family of equilibria, not just the classical fullemployment equilibrium, but many aggregate demand equilibria with
involuntary unemployment, equilibria not escaped or escapable by ad
justments of prices. This indeed is the meaning of "general" in his
title. Although he modifies his opening statement of his theory in later
chapters, particularly chapter 19, his overall theme stands: the natural
endogenous adjustment mechanisms cannot be counted on. That is why
Keynes regarded macroeconomic interventions by government as
essential.
The question, as Keynes saw it, was whether reductions in wages
and prices would increase aggregate demand, and thus take the economy
to full-employment equilibrium. His answer contained two strands. First,
nominal wages would not fall rapidly in response to excess supply of
labor. This strand is the one that sticks in the memory of the profes
sion, exaggerated into assumed wage or price rigidity. Second, even
if wages, and with them prices, were flexible, deflation would not in
crease aggregate demand and eliminate unemployment and underutilization of capital. This is the stand the profession has forgotten or neglected.
The Origins of Wage Stickiness in Keynesian Theory
I will say something about the first strand, although it is not my cen
tral topic here. It is routinely and unquestioningly supposed that Keynes
attributed "money illusion" to workers. Neoclassical theorists therefore
dismiss Keynesian theory out of hand. Often Keynesians accede to the
charge but defend it on grounds of realism. I have come to believe that
Keynes's argument is free of the taint. And although it is not logically
tight, it can be made so. Let me explain.
You will recall that Keynes's workers were willing to accept a cut
in real wages achieved by an increase in the price of wage goods. Yet
they were not willing to take a cut in money wages. Keynes's reason
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for this asymmetry is theoretically impeccable and at the same time
realistic. Workers are concerned primarily with relative wages, with
how their pay compares with those to whom they regard themselves
at least equal in merit. Labor markets are disaggregated and desynchronized. To any single worker or local group, a nominal wage cut
appears to be a loss in relative wages; there is no assurance that others
will also take cuts. On the other hand, an increase in the cost of living
is the same for everybody. Workers may be perfectly prepared to receive
lower real wages with unchanged relative wages, but labor market in
stitutions give them no way to communicate this willingness.
That real wages are too high is the time-worn orthodox explanation
of unemployment. If labor unions or government regulations keep them
too high, unemployment is classical, not amenable to remedy by de
mand expansion. There is an identification problem, because the same
observable symptoms are consistent with different causes. Keynes agreed
that it is likely that real wages are in depressions above their full employ
ment values. But, he argued, that is not the same thing as saying they
are rigid at their high depression values. Just try expanding demand,
and you will see that profit margins can be expanded and real wages
reduced as necessary to make higher employment profitable to
employers.
As I observed above, recovery may not require lowering of real wages.
But it is still true that the way to get higher employment is to raise ag
gregate demand, at the same time as money wages are stuck because
of concerns for relative wage parity. Those concerns do not depend
on money illusion. They are certainly not irrational. They are very
human, and there is a great deal of empirical evidence of their
importance.
The hole in the story in the General Theory is that it doesn't explain
how the concerns of employed workers prevail when there are
unemployed workers willing to work for less pay real, nominal, or
relative. The power of insiders vis-a-vis employers and outsiders evident
ly derives from the costs of turnover among members of an interdepen
dent working team. Insider power is rightly the subject of considerable
theoretical and empirical inquiry right now, for example by Assar Lind-
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beck and his colleagues in Stockholm. Labor economists have long
observed that queues of jobseekers outside the factory gate have little
effect on the wages paid to employees inside. Hard times do bring wage
cuts, but generally through so damaging the financial and competitive
positions of employers that they can credibly threaten layoffs of senior
workers and even plant closings and bankruptcies.
Keynes did not squarely face the fact that the realistic descriptions
of labor markets in his own argument were inconsistent with his assump
tion of pure competition in all markets. Wages are administered or
negotiated prices. They are not set in impersonal auction markets. The
same is true, of course, of product prices. Keynes did recognize that
his theory applies to economies where the wages administered or
negotiated are money wages. Things would be quite different with com
plete indexation.

The Weakness or Perversity of Price Effects on Aggregate Demand
The second strand in Keynes's basic argument was this: Even if money
wages and prices were flexible, even if excess supplies of labor led to
cuts in money wages, this flexibility would not prevent unemployment.
Given a contractionary shock in aggregate demand, deflation of money
wages and prices would not restore real demand to its full employment
value. The classical market-clearing adjustment mechanism was, in
Keynes's view, much too frail to bear the weight of macroeconomic
stabilization. In fact, Keynes recommended stability rather than flex
ibility in money wages.
Two issues in this debate need to be distinguished. The first concerns
the relation of real aggregate demand to the price level. The second
concerns its relation to the expected rate of change of prices. In discussing
them, I shall not distinguish between money wages and prices and their
rates of change, but rather follow the assumption, conventional in this
debate, that they move together. I remind you that the theoretical argu
ment refers to a closed economy. You could think of the United States
in years gone by, or of post-1992 Europe, or of the whole OECD area.
Keynes in Book I denied that real aggregate demand was related at
all to the price and money wage level. In effect he turned the classical
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neutrality proposition against the classicals. If all money wages and prices
are lowered in the same proportion, how can real quantities demanded
be any different? Thus if a real shock makes real demand deficient,
how can a purely nominal price adjustment undo the damage? Actual
ly, Keynes himself provided an answer in chapter 19. If the nominal
quantity of money remains the same, its real quantity increases, interest
rates fall, and real demand increases. This scenario is often called the
"Keynes effect." This mechanism would fail if demand for money
became perfectly elastic with respect to interest rates the famous
liquidity trap or if demand for goods for consumption and investment
were perfectly inelastic.
Pigou and other authors provided another scenario, the "Pigou ef
fect" or "real balance effect," which alleges a direct effect of increas
ed wealth, in the case at hand taking the form of the increased real value
of base money, on real consumption demand (possibly also on invest
ment demand). This does not depend on reduction of interest rates.
The theoretical fraternity has taken the Pigou effect as a decisive refuta
tion of Keynes's claim to have found underemployment equilibria. As
long as involuntary unemployment and excess capacity push wages and
prices down, there will be an equilibrium when and only when they
reach so low a level that monetary wealth is so great that aggregate
demand creates jobs for all willing workers.
The Pigou effect is of dubious strength, and even of uncertain sign.
Most nominal assets in a modern economy are "inside" assets, that
is, the debts of private agents to other private agents. They wash out
in accounting aggregation, leaving only the government's nominal debt
to the private sector as new wealth. Some, if not all, of that debt is
internalized by taxpayers. The base of the real balance effect is therefore
quite small relative to the economy in the United States the monetary
base is only 6 percent of GNP.
That inside assets and debts wash out in accounting aggregation does
not mean that the effects of price changes on their real value wash out.
Price declines make creditors better off and debtors poorer. Their
marginal propensities to spend from wealth need not be the same. Com
mon sense suggests that debtors would have the higher spending pro
pensities; that is why they are in debt. Such a differential could easily

74

swamp the Pigou effect. We're talking about gross amounts of 200 per
cent of GNP. I like to call this reverse Pigou effect a Fisher effect,
because Irving Fisher emphasized the increased burden of debt resulting
from (unanticipated) deflation as a major factor in depressions in general
and in the Great Depression in particular. It is quite possible that this
Fisher effect is stronger than the Pigou and Keynes effects combined,
particularly when output and employment are low relative to capacity. 2
The argument I have just made refers to levels of nominal wages and
prices. An even more important argument refers to rates of change.
The Keynes and Pigou effects compare high prices and low as if they
were timeless alternatives, without worrying about the process of change
from high to low in real time. Economists of the day argued in this
way quite consciously, as required by the rules of the comparative statics
game they were playing. The process of change works on aggregate
demand in just the wrong direction. Greater expected deflation, or ex
pected disinflation, is an increase in the real rate of interest, necessari
ly so when nominal interest rates are constrained by the zero floor of
the interest on money. Here is another Fisher effect, another factor Fisher
stressed in explanation of the Great Depression. Keynes stressed it too,
as a pragmatic dynamic reinforcement of the lesson of his static general
theory.
He was right to do so. In a 1975 article3 I exhibited a simple
macroeconomic system, classical in the sense that it has only one
equilibrium, characterized by full employment, indeed by a "natural*'
rate of unemployment. Given the monetary base, the price level is stable
in that equilibrium. The dynamic stability of the system depends on the
relative strengths of the real balance effect and the real interest effect.
If the real interest effect dominates, as it well may if the real balance
effect is weak and certainly will if the Fisher debt burden effect prevails,
then the equilibrium is unstable. Moreover, the system could be stable
locally but unstable for large displacements.
I regarded my article as supporting Keynes's intuition that price and
wage flexibility are bad for real stability. I wanted to shake the profes
sion off its conventional interpretation of Keynesian economics, accord
ing to which unemployment arises only because of a dubious asser-
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tion of wage and price rigidity. I wanted to recall and reinforce the sec
ond strand of Keynes's argument, according to which unemployment
is attributable to inadequate real demand, a deficiency that flexibility
will not remedy. That is also what I am hoping to do here.
I am quite willing to subscribe to a meaning of equilibrium that ex
cludes involuntary unemployment, and to characterize depressions as
disequilibria. Either way, the Keynesian diagnosis and prescription are
the same in practice.
Recently, at long last, the question whether price flexibility (in any
sense short of the Walrasian Auctioneer fairy tale) is stabilizing has
begun to receive serious attention. DeLong and Summers4 have in
vestigated it in the Taylor staggered-contract model, amended to allow
price-level and price-change effects on demand. The Taylor model results
in unemployment when there are new circumstances and information,
because wages and prices cannot be immediately adjusted to them. It
also allows Keynesian policies to work temporarily, because the
authorities can react to new circumstances and information before ex
isting contracts are renegotiated.
DeLong and Summers simulate increased flexibility by making the
periods in the staggered-contract model shorter. They find that increased
flexibility in this sense frequently does make real outcomes, employ
ment and output, more volatile, not less. The reason is the same as in
my model, the Fisher real interest rate effect of inflation and deflation.
Their most interesting simulation has the intuitively desirable result that
in the limit perfect price flexibility instantaneous jumps of the Walra
sian solution in response to shocks does stabilize real variables perfect
ly. Close to this limit, greater price flexibility means greater real stability,
but farther away from it, the reverse is true.

Nominal and Real Demand Shocks
I began by calling your attention to the caricature of the Keynesian
theory of business fluctuations all too generally accepted in the profes
sion. According to that caricature, fluctuations in real output and employ
ment arise from shocks to nominal aggregate demand, which become
real shocks only because prices are rigid. Tides ebb and flow; they matter
to boats only because they pass over rocks.
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Keynesian theory of business fluctuations stresses shocks to real ag
gregate demand investment, consumption, or government purchases.
Some impulses may indeed come from the monetary side, but that does
not make them purely nominal. A monetary policy action that lowers
nominal interest rates also lowers real rates and affects investment de
mand. Likewise, a shift in production functions that raises the marginal
productivity of capital stimulates investment and diminishes the demand
for money at the same time. The world is not constructed in the
dichotomous way assumed in the common classification of shocks as
either nominal or real.
The great achievement of the General Theory is the theory of effec
tive demand. Keynes's insight was that demand is constrained by amounts
actually sold in markets, which may frequently be less than the amounts
agents would like to sell at existing prices. This was a deeper insight
than the assertion that nominal wages and prices are "rigid." I com
mend it to the New Keynesians as a more fruitful and important line
of inquiry than the macroeconomic role of the real costs of changing
nominal prices on menus, price lists, and catalogs.
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I. Introduction
In this essay, I was asked to assess the state of economic science,
necessarily from my own personal perspective, which is perhaps less
representative of median or mainstream evaluation than those perspec
tives that may be offered by my peers in this series.* I shall make no
attempt to be comprehensive here, although the implications of my whole
argument for the economist's stance as both a positive and normative
scientist involve major shifts in attitudes toward the disciplinary sub
ject matter. I shall concentrate discussion on my understanding of what
an economy is, from which inferential criticisms of research programs,
didactic instruction, and policy implementation emerge, more or less
as a matter of course.
I may succeed in attracting your attention by stating two of these
criticisms boldly at the outset. First, there is no place for
macroeconomics, either as a part of our positive science or as a realm
for policy action. Second, the appropriate mathematics is game theory
am indebted to my colleague, Viktor Vanberg, for helpful comments on an earlier draft
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rather than maximization of objective functions subject to constraints.
These apparently unrelated criticisms emerge from understanding and
interpreting the economy nonteleologically, as an order, rather than
understanding-interpreting the economy Ideologically, as an institutional
arrangement that is to be evaluated in terms of relative success or failure
to achieve assigned system-defined objectives. Were I to have a subti
tle for this essay, it would be "The Economy as a Constitutional Order."
I would append the word "constitutional" to the word "order" so as
to indicate that my perspective differs both from those evolutionists who
do emphasize the economy as an order but who, at the same time, deny
that such an order can be "constituted," and from those who fail to
make the distinction between constitutional and post-constitutional levels
of choice.
Before proceeding, let me also classify myself philosophically. I am
a methodological and normative individualist, a radical subjectivist, a
contractarian, and a constitutionalist. These descriptive attributes are
familiar to those of you who may have been exposed variously to my
published works over four decades. In a very real sense, these works
are little more than my continuing and considered assessment of the
state of economics or political economy. I have always been, and re
main, an outsider, whose efforts have been devoted to changing the
direction of the disciplinary research program. There is perhaps less
reason for me to take a reflective look at where we are scientifically
than there is for those of my peers who have remained inside the domi
nant research program that describes what economists do. You would
scarcely expect me to take on some new colors at this stage, and I assure
you that there has been no recent conversion to a new paradigm. No
one has had, or will have, occasion to label me as a holder of the con
ventional wisdom.
I shall proceed as follows. Section II examines the relationships be
tween scarcity, choice, and value maximization within the domain of
economics as scientific inquiry. My aim in this section is to demonstrate
how these concepts, by having been placed in too central a role, have
generated intellectual confusion. Section in extends the perspective to
examine the appropriateness of macroeconomics in the subject matter
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domain of our discipline. Section IV briefly treats the grand organiza
tional alternatives and develops the notion that the conception of what
the economy is does have normative implications. Section V compares
and contrasts the two approaches in terms of the shift from individual
to social choice. Finally, in Section VI, the argument is summarized.

II. Scarcity, Choice, and the Maximization of Value
I do not know what the 1989 instructors in economics tell their students
about the content of the discipline. Perhaps they simply ignore defini
tional starting points. But I do recall that, in the 1940s, economic theory
(price theory) courses commenced with something like Milton Friedman's statement (1962) to the effect that economics is the study of how
a particular society solves its economic problem. And, at least in the
1940s, everyone knew that "the economic problem" was defined by
Lionel Robbins (1932) as the allocation of scarce resources among alter
native ends. Scarcity, the inability to meet all demands, implies that
choices must be made, from which it seems to follow directly that a
criterion for "better" and "worse" choices is required. This criterion
emerges as some common denominator that allows the differing demands
to be translated into a single dimension, which we then label as "utili
ty" or "value." The "economic principle" offers the abstractly defined
normative solution to the economic problem. Scarce resources are
allocated among alternative uses so as to secure maximum value when
a unit of each scarce resource yields equivalent value in each use to
which it is put. Satisfying this norm maximizes value subject to the
resource scarcity constraints. Economics, as a realm for scientific in
quiry, does indeed seem to be reducible to applied maximization; the
calculus seems surely to be its basic mathematics.
I want to suggest here that this economics, which is the economics
that I learned both as a student and as a young professional, generates
intellectual confusion and misunderstanding because it focuses atten
tion inappropriately on scarcity, on choice, and on value maximiza
tion, while shifting attention away from the institutional structure of
an economy, with the consequent failure to make elementary distinc-
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tions among alternative structures. Given the dominance of the Robbins formulation in the economic theory of mid-century, it is not sur
prising that market solutions were often modeled as analogous to plan
ning solutions to the resource allocation problem. Economists proceeded
as if "the market" embodies "social choices" among alternative alloca
tions of resources, choices that may be compared with those that might
emerge from the monolithic decisions of a single planner. Given the
mind-set of mid-century, it is also not surprising that Arrow (1951) ex
tended his impossibility theorem to the market as well as to political choice.
As early as 1963, in my presidential address to the Southern Economic
Association (1964), I criticized the central role assigned to the max
imizing paradigm in economics, and I called for a revival of "catallactics" (or "catallaxy") as the core of our discipline. My argument was
that economics, as a social science, is or should be about trade, ex
change, and the many and varied institutional forms that implement and
facilitate trade, including all of the complexities of modern contracts
as well as the whole realm of collective agreement on the constitutional
rules of political society.
In a basic conceptual sense, the exchange process remains categorically
different from the choosing process. In exchange, there is a necessary
interaction between (among) separate actors (participants), no one of
which can choose among "solutions." In exchange, each participant
does, of course, make choices among alternative bids and offers
(strategies). But these choices of any single participant are, at most,
only a part of the interaction process. A solution to an exchange emerges
only from the choices made, separately and independently, by all par
ticipants in the process. This solution, as such, is not explicitly chosen
by any one of the participants, or by the set of participants organized
as a collective entity. This solution is simply not within the choice set
of either individual actors or the collectivity.
This elementary sketch of exchange provides the basis for my early
assertion that game theory offers the appropriate mathematical
framework that facilitates an abstract understanding of economics. In
exchange, as in ordinary games, players or participants may be model
ed as behaving so as to maximize their separately defined utilities, sub-
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ject to the constraints separately faced, as defined by the rules, the en
dowments, and the predicted responses of other participants. The stan
dard maximizing behavior embodied in rational choice models may,
of course, be accepted for this analytical exercise. But, in exchange,
again as in ordinary games, neither any single player-participant nor
the set of players-participants, as a group, treats the outcome of the
process as a maximand. The solution to the exchange process, simple
or complex, is not the solution of a maximization problem, and to model
it as such is the continuing source of major intellectual confusion in
the whole discipline.
Equilibrium in any exchange interaction signals the exhaustion of the
mutual gains, and this solution, as such, has behavioral properties that
also describe positions of maxima for all choices. At equilibrium, no
participant has an incentive to make further bids (offers) within the rules
that define the structure of the interaction. In the equilibrium of the
ideally competitive economy, there is no incentive, either for any single
participant, or for any group of participants, including the all-inclusive
group, to modify the results within the rules. 1 But what is maximized
in this solution to the competitive "game"? That which is maximized,
in any sense at all meaningful for behavior, is the value for each par
ticipant, as determined separately and subjectively, subject to the en
dowments initially possessed and to the expressed preferences of others
in the nexus, as reflected in the bids (offers) made in markets. There
is no "social" or "collective" value maximization, as such, in the ex
change process, even in some idealized sense. Aggregative value,
measured in some numeraire, is, of course, at a maximum in the solu
tion, but this is a definitional consequence of the equilibrium. The relative
prices of goods and services are themselves determined in the process
of attaining the equilibrium, and it is only when these emergent prices
are used that any maximum value, as an aggregate, can be defined.
Since an abstractly defined maximum for aggregative value cannot
exist independently of the market process through which it is achiev
ed, it is meaningless to refer to a shortfall in aggregative value, as such,
except as some indirect identification of failure to exhaust gains from
trade among participants somewhere in the nexus. Since participants
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are presumed able to make their own within-exchange choices, the
political economist's hypotheses that value is not being maximized must
be derived from observations that there exist impediments to the trading
process (Buchanan 1959, 1988), whether at the simple level of buyerseller exchange or at the level of all-inclusive complex "exchanges"
in public goods. The observing political economist is unable, even con
ceptually, to construct a "social welfare function" that will allow him
to carry out a maximization exercise analogous to that which the plan
ner for a centralized economy must undertake. For such a planner, his
choices are analogous, even if at a different dimension of complexity,
to those faced by any single participant in the exchange nexus.

III. Macroeconomics and Constitutional Political Economy
The basic and elementary distinction between the maximizing and
the exchange paradigms supports the proposition advanced earlier con
cerning the suggested exclusion of macroeconomics from the domain
of our disciplinary subject matter, at least macroeconomics as normal
ly defined. That which is generated in the economic interaction pro
cess, whether or not represented as a formalized, abstractly defined
equilibrium or solution, emerges from the separate and interdependent
choices made by many participants, choices that are coordinated, whether
efficaciously or not, through the institutional arrangements that define
the economic structure. The economy wide aggregated variables, such
as national income or product, rates of employment, capacity utiliza
tion, or growth, are not variables subject to choice, either directly or
indirectly, by individual participants in the economy or by political agents
who may presume to act on behalf of all participants as a collectivity,
or any subset thereof.
It is intellectually confusing even to model "the economy" as if its
normative purpose is one of maximizing income and/or employment,
or, indeed, as if 'the economy' has normative purpose at all. As noted
earlier, any failure of the interaction process to generate maximum value
must reflect failure to exploit gains from trade, whether simple or com
plex. This putative diagnosis calls attention to the structure itself which
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may contain constraints that prevent the consummation of mutually ad
vantageous trades.
Alternative structures are, of course, to be evaluated indirectly by
observations of the patterns of results generated, and these results may
be represented in terms of the familiar macroaggregated variables such
as the level and growth of national product or employment. An economy
that persistently generates wide swings in levels of income and employ
ment would, appropriately, be deemed to be a structural failure, and
such a pattern of results should offer incentives to investigate, locate,
and identify the structural sources of the problem, leading ultimately
to structural-institutional reform.
The tragic flaw in Keynesian-inspired macroeconomics lies in its ac
ceptance, and, hence, neglect, of structure while concentrating almost
exclusive attention on the prospects and potential for "guiding" the
economy toward more satisfactory target levels of the aggregative
variables. It is not at all surprising, when viewed in retrospect, that
this monumental misdirection of scientific effort should have occurred,
given the dominance of the maximizing paradigm during the critical
years of mid-century. There was a general failure to recognize that the
whole intellectual construction is inconsistent with a structure that allows
for the independent choice behavior of many participants in the economic
nexus. As Keynes himself recognized in his preface to the German
translation of his book, the whole reinterpretation of the economic pro
cess in a normatively directed ideological model was more applicable
to an authoritarian regime than to a democratic one.
I do not want to suggest, however, that the classical economists, at
least those who were the targets of Keynes's direct criticism, were free
of their own peculiar sort of blindness that led them, also, to neglect
structural elements. In their implied presumption that results embody
ing satisfactory levels of the aggregative variables would emerge, in
dependently of possible structural failures, these economists were illprepared to defend the discipline against the emotionally driven zealots
for macroeconomic management.
The intellectual, scientific and policy scenario should have been, and
could have been, so different in those critical decades before mid-century.
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Little was really needed beyond an elementary recognition that the
economic process functions well only within a legal-constitutional struc
ture that embodies predictability in the value of the monetary unit, ac
companied by a regime reform that would have been designed to
guarantee such predictability. (In this respect alone, a unique window
of opportunity was missed in the 1930s.) Macroeconomic theory, in
both its lower and its higher reaches, need not have been born at all,
along with the whole industry.that designs, constructs and operates the
large macroeconomic models. 2

IV. Socialism, Laissez Faire, Interventionist!!,
and the Structure of an Economy
It is now widely acknowledged, both in theory and in practice, that
socialism was (is) a failure. The socialist god is dead; the promise that
was once associated with socialism, as an overarching principle for social
organization, no longer exists. The romantic image of the state as an
omniscient and benevolent entity, an image that had been around since
Hegel, was shattered by the simple observation that those who act on
behalf of the state are also ordinary humans, like the rest of us, who
respond to standard incentives within the limited informational setting
they confront. Centralized economic planning, with state ownership and
control over means of production, has entered history as intellectual
folly, despite the record of its having attracted the attention of so many
brilliant minds in the first half of this century, and also despite the awful
realization that efforts to implement this folly involved the needless
sacrifice of millions of lives.
At the opposing end to socialism on the imagined ideological spec
trum stands the equally romantic ideal of laissez faire, the fictional im
age of the anarcho-capitalists, in which there is no role for the state
at all. In this model, freely choosing individuals, who have somehow
costlessly escaped from the Hobbesian jungle, will create and maintain
markets in all goods and services, including the market for protection
of person and possessions. It is as difficult to think systematically about
this society as it is to think of that society peopled by the "new men"
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of idealized communism. Robert Nozick's derivation (1974) of the
minimally coercive state was surely convincing even to those stubborn
minds who held onto the laissez-faire dream.
Any plausibly realistic analysis of social order, whether positive or
normative, must be bounded by the limits set by these ideological ex
tremes. The state is neither omniscient nor benevolent, but a politicallegal framework is an essential element in any functioning order of
human interaction. The analysis, discussion, and debate then centers
on the degree or extent of political control over and intervention into
the interaction process. The extended interventionist state remains a
viable alternative in the ongoing political argument and proponents for
such a state are found among scientists and citizens alike, and despite
the general loss of faith in the socialist ideal. Opposed to the extended
interventionist polity lies the minimal or protective state, tempered
variously by acknowledgment of the appropriateness of both produc
tive and transfer state elements. 3
Questions may be raised at this point concerning how these issues
relate to my evaluation of the state of economic science, which was,
after all, my assigned task for this essay. I return to my central theme.
My hypothesis is that the basic conceptualization of what' 'an economy"
or "the economy" is, the paradigmatic vision of what it is that we are
inquiring into and about, does, indeed, carry direct normative implica
tions. In a real sense, my hypothesis suggests that divergent normative
stances may reflect divergent understandings rather than differing
ultimate values. If this hypothesis is descriptively accurate, genuine scien
tific progress may be made at the level of fundamental understanding
(methodology) as well as at the apparent cutting edges of some presumed
invariant empirical reality. 4
Applied somewhat more narrowly, my hypothesis is that the normatively preferred scope for state or collective intervention will de
pend directly upon the conceptualization of what the economy is, as
the subject for scientific inquiry. That is to say, the normative debate
on the turf bounded between the socialist and the laissez-faire extremes
will reflect the divergent models of the observed reality. In a certain
sense, the ought is derived from the presumed is.
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Let me try to be more specific. I suggest that an accepted understand
ing of the economy as an order of interaction constrained within a set
of rules or constraints, leads more or less directly to a normatively prefer
red minimal intervention with the results of such interaction. By com
parison and by contrast, an accepted understanding of the economy as
an engine, mechanism, or means, organized for the achievement of
specifically defined purposes, leads more or less directly to a normatively
preferred stance of expediency in evaluating possible state or collec
tive intervention with the interaction process.
Many textbooks commence with a discussion of the functions of an
economy, as introduced by Frank H. Knight (1934). I have suggested
(1988) that even so much as a listing of "functions" for an economy
may generate confusion and misunderstanding. If the economy, as such,
is without purpose, how can we attribute functions to its operation? The
economy-as-order conceptualization forces us to restrict evaluation to
the relative success of the structure in facilitating the accomplishment
of whatever it is that the separately interacting participants may seek.
(Again, the basic game analogy is useful. We evaluate the rules that
describe a game by assessing how successful these rules are in allow
ing players to achieve those objectives they seek in playing.)
The point here may be made emphatically in the simple example of
two-person, two-good exchange. Two traders are presumed to hold en
dowments in two goods, and these endowments are assumed to be
mutually acknowledged to be owned by the initial holders. The traders
are observed to engage in exchange, and a post-trade distribution of
endowments different from the pre-trade distribution emerges. How do
observing economists evaluate this simple exchange process? The two
interpretations or understandings involve quite different exercises. The
mechanistic, functionalist, Ideological understanding introduces a
presumed prior knowledge of individual utility or preference orderings,
and the post-trade positions are compared with the pre-trade positions,
for each trader. If the comparisons indicate that each trader has moved
to a higher level of utility, the exchange is judged to have been mutual
ly utility-enhancing.
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The economy-as-order understanding proceeds quite differently. The
economist does not call upon some presumed prior knowledge of the
utility or preference functions of the two traders to be able to conclude
that the exchange has been utility-enhancing for each trader. He does
not evaluate the results of exchange Ideologically against some previous
ly defined and known scalar. Instead, he adjudges the exchange to have
been utility-enhancing for each trader to the extent that the process itself
has embodied attributes of fairness and propriety. If there has been
neither force nor fraud, and if the exchange has been voluntary on the
part of both traders, it is classified to have been mutually beneficial.
When the economist analyzes the behavior of the traders in entering
into and agreeing on terms of exchange, he may, if desired, use the
language of utility maximization, provided that the exclusive emphasis
is placed on individuals' behavior in maximizing their separately iden
tified utilities, which are not observable independently.
Important implications for potential intervention in voluntary ex
changes stem from the contrasting interpretations here. If the economist
bases his evaluation on the relative success of the exchange in moving
the traders higher on an independently existing utility scalar, he may
be led to recommend intervention even in the absence of observation
of force, fraud, or coercion in the exchange process itself. This ap
proach provides the basis for paternalistic, merit-goods arguments for
collective interferences with voluntary market exchanges. The individual
may not act so as to maximize his own utility. On the other hand, if
the observing economist bases his evaluation exclusively on the pro
cess of the exchange itself, recommendations for collective interven
tion must be limited to proposals for removing barriers to trade inclusive
ly defined.
We can remain with the simple exchange example to discuss the role
of agreement in the two interpretations-understandings of economic in
teraction, along with the place of the Pareto criterion in any evaluative
exercise. Exchange involves agreement on the part of traders, both upon
entry into trade and upon terms of trade. The emergence of a postexchange distribution of goods signals an equilibrium of sorts. The
Ideological interpretation of exchange does not call upon agreement
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for any critical purpose. The dual criteria are the separate utility scalars
of our two traders, presumed known to the assessor prior to trade. If
exchange moves each trader higher on the scalar assigned to him, the
change is defined to have been Pareto superior. The welfare assess
ment can be positive without any necessary resort to interpersonal utility
comparisons.
By contrast, the economy-as-order interpretation depends critically
upon agreement as the criterion for assessment. Since there are no in
dependently existent scalars, the only indication that traders have im
proved their position lies in their observed agreement. A positive welfare
assessment becomes possible because the agreement has signaled mutual
ly preferred change. Agreement is the means of defining Pareto
(Wicksell) superiority, and it is the only means that exists.
V. From Individual to Social Choice: Utilitarian
Versus Contractarian Foundations
The economist who conceptualizes the economy as a potential welfaregenerating mechanism or instrument may be unwilling to limit criteria
of evaluation to separately imputed, individually identified scalars.
Almost by necessity, and despite the acknowledged insupportability of
a simplistic utilitarianism, some attempt will be made to derive mean
ingful measures for "social" or "collective" utility. This is the essen
tial thrust behind the invention-elaboration-use of the social welfare func
tion constructions in mid-century theoretical welfare economics, con
structions that embodied both explicit introduction of ethical judgments
and the relevance of the Pareto escape from direct interpersonal utility
comparability. This whole exercise involved a search for a post-Robbins
scalar against which the potential performance of the economy might
be measured, a scalar that could be set up to exist independently of the
performance itself. Success or failure of that which is evaluated, the
economy or the market, is then determined from some comparison of
observed results with those that might have been achieved. Modern
economists who resorted to the social welfare function constructions,
and despite all their methodological and philosophical sophistication,
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have really not succeeded in escaping from the utilitarian foundations
from which the whole maximizing-allocationist paradigm emerged late
in the nineteenth century.
If we shuck off the utilitarian trappings and simply abandon efforts
to construct a scalar that will allow evaluation of performance for the
economy or the market, as such, we are then forced into an acceptance
of the alternative conceptualization advanced here, that of the economy
as an order, or structure, or set of rules, the performance of which is
not to be evaluated in terms of results that are conceptually divorced
from the behavior of acting individuals within the order itself. Within
the order or structure, individuals engage in trade. If we then generalize
the trading interaction and extend its application over large numbers
of actors, we may begin to explain, derive, and analyze social or political
interdependence as complex exchange, as a relationship that embodies
political voluntary agreement as an appropriate criterion of legitimation.
The contractarian tradition in political philosophy offers the intellec
tual avenue that facilitates the shift of inquiry from simple market ex
change engaged in by two traders to the intricacies of politics. Many
critics balk at this extension. They may accept the centrality of volun
tary exchange in economic process but remain unwilling to model politics
in the exchange paradigm. By simple observation, so say such critics,
politics is about conflict and coercion. How can we even begin to ex
plain political reality by an exchange model?
The contractarian response requires a recognition of the distinction
between the constitutional and the in-constitutional or post-constitutional
levels of political interaction, a distinction without which any normative
justification for political coercion could not exist, at least for the nor
mative individualist. Conflict, coercion, zero-sum or negative sum rela
tionships among persons these interactions do indeed characterize
political institutions, as they may be observed to operate within a set
of constitutional rules, that is, within a given constitutional order. The
complex exchange model which embodies agreement among the many
participants in the political "game" is clearly inapplicable here. But
if analysis and attention are shifted to the level of rules, among which
choices are possible, we can use potential and actual agreement among
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persons on these rules as the criterion for normative legitimacy. And
such agreement way well produce rules, or sets of rules, that will operate
so that, in particularized sequences of ordinary politics (single plays
of the game) there may be negatively valued results for some of the
participants (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
Note that there is a more or less natural extension from the simple
model of market exchange to the complex model of constitutional
politics. There is no categorical distinction between the economic and
the political process; inquiry in each case centers on the choice behavior
of individuals who act, one with another, to choose rules that will, in
turn, constrain their within-rule choices that will, in their turn, generate
patterns of results. Note also, however, that this politics-as-complexexchange derivation is not readily available to the economist who re
mains trapped in the maximizing straight] acket.

VI. The Political Economy as a Constitutional Order
I fudged a bit earlier in this essay when I indicated that my subtitle
for it would have been "The Economy as a Constitutional Order." It
should now be clear from my discussion that I define the institutions
of both the economy and the polity as belonging to an inclusive con
stitutional order that we may designate as "the political economy." The
political economy is described by the whole set of constraints, or struc
ture, within which individuals act in furtherance of their own objectives.
Defined exclusively, these constraints include physical and
technological limits, including those embodied in human capacities, that
can be taken as invariant. These "absolutes" are beyond my range of
interest, except to note that much of the folly of the socialist idea stemmed
from a failure to recognize the relative immalleability of human be
ings. My concern here, however, is with the set of constraints that are
subject to deliberative change, and, hence, to choice. 5 Because these
constraints are general and extend over all participants in the political
economy, any choice must be, by definition, public, in the classic public
good sense of this term. A shift in constraints for any one actor must
apply for all actors.
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Let me now return to the distinction made earlier between the con
stitutional and the in-constitutional levels of choice. Given any set of
constraints, individuals will, separately and jointly, act in pursuit of
their own interests and objectives. For some purposes, it is useful to
take the existing constraints as a set of relatively absolute absolutes and
to direct inquiry to predictions about the emergence of patterns of results.
This domain of positive economics is productive, but it should not lead
to the inference that these patterns of results can be modified to meet
predetermined objectives, independently of any shift in the constraints
themselves. Such effort must be paralleled by analyses aimed at predic
ting results that will emerge under alternative constraints, other rules
of the game, other constitutional structures. As I noted earlier, the
tragedy of the Keynesian enterprise lay in its failed effort to modify
aggregative results directly, due to its oversight of any prospects for
institutional-constitutional change.
If the political economy is conceived as being described, in part, by
constraints that can be subject to explicit collective choice, attention
is immediately drawn to prospects for constitutional-institutional change.
Once again the game analogy is helpful; we change a game by chang
ing the rules, which will, in turn, modify the predicted pattern of out
comes. If we diagnose the patterns of results observed to be less desired
than alternative patterns deemed to be possible, it is incumbent on us,
as political economists, to examine predicted results under alternative
constraint structures. It is not legitimate to criticize, for example, an
existing distribution of income of allocation of resources as being un
just, inequitable, or inefficient, without being able, at the same time,
to demonstrate some proposed alternative regime that can be expected
to generate distributions or allocations that will do better by the same
standards (Vining 1984; Usher 1981; Brennan and Buchanan 1985).
No one will, of course, be surprised that I have used the occasion
of this essay to present a varied reiteration of the case for "constitu
tional political economy" as the research program that should command
the current attention of economists. As such, this research program in
volves both positive and normative elements. Some critics have often
accused me of skirting dangerously close to, if not actually commit-
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ting, the naturalistic fallacy, that of deriving the "ought" from the "is."
I have never been concerned with such criticisms directly because, as
noted earlier, in a certain sense we do derive 'oughts' from our con
ceptions of what "is." The "is" that we take to be the economy does,
indeed, have direct implications for how we ought to behave in our
capacities as citizens who indirectly make collective choices among sets
of rules. And let us be sure to understand that there is no "is" that
is "out there" to the observing eye, ear, or skin. We create our
understanding of the "is" by imposing an abstract structure on observed
events. And it is this understanding that defines for us the effective limits
of the feasible. It is dangerous nonsense to think that we do or can do
otherwise.
NOTES
1. In slightly more formal terms, the competitive equilibrium is in the core of the game. This
conclusion holds only if the rules of the game are strictly defined and enforced, and especially
in relation to the incentives offered to potential monopolizing coalitions
2. Because of the near-universal failure of economists to look at structure, then and now, we
face, in the 1990s, even more potential unpredictability in the value of the monetary units than
we did in the 1920s. Given the inherent structural defect in our monetary regime, macroeconomic
theorizing and the macro models may be useful, if for no other reason than that our discretionary
monopolists of fiat issue may use such models for their own purposes The macro money game
that we all must play is cumbersome, complex, and confusing It is sheer intellectual folly, joined
with some jealousy for pseudo-scientific inquiry, to pretend that a regime shift could not produce
dramatic increase in well-being for almost everyone
With predictability in the value of the monetary unit established (with any one of the several
alternative regimes that might be the replacement for the discretionary authority in existence),
economists could then get on with their appropriate social roles of analyzing the exchange pro
cess in detail, with identifying barriers to the implementation of value-enhancing voluntary ex
changes, with advancing hypotheses concerning changes in constraints that allow individuals to
exploit more fully all potential for mutual gams
3. A cynical observer might suggest that little, if any, scientific progress has been made since
1776, when Adam Smith first presented the antimercantilist argument from which modern economics
emerged Mercantilism (protectionism, mterventiomsm) seems to have reemerged in the decades
of the 1970s and 1980s in partial replacement for the acknowledged demise of socialism.
4. As my great professor, Frank H. Knight, once remarked at the end of an impressively presented
empirical survey, "proving that water runs downhill," which expresses my own verdict on much
of what I see in the now-dominant empirical emphasis of modern economic research I doubt
if many economists are convinced by empirical evidence alone, although I acknowledge that the
linkage between evidence and understanding remains mysterious
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5. I do not accept the implications of the analyses of some cultural evolutionists, who suggest
that the basic institutions of social order evolve without conscious design and, by inference, sug
gest also that deliberate improvement in these institutions may be impossible, and, further, that
attempts at improvement are harmful
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The title of this volume of essays is "The State of Economic Science,"
but I should not like to limit myself to just describing where economics
is now: I would like also to say something, however conjectural, about
the future. Since, in contrast to Larry Klein, forecasting is not my pro
fessional metier, perhaps I can avoid some of the dangers of amateurism
by putting more emphasis on the prescriptive than on the predictive;
by taking high moral ground and telling economics what it should be
doing that it is not now doing.
Consensus and Dissention Among Economists
With this agenda, my emphasis will be on methodological issues: on
what kinds of research economists should be doing and what tools they
will need for doing it. But my methodological prescriptions need to derive
from a view of the substance of economics and its problems, and should
rest on an assessment of where economic science stands today. Let me
begin with that.

Public Disagreement Among Economists
I must first explain why economists are seen by the general public
to be constantly disagreeing with one another. Of course that is not
97
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wholly true with respect to my distinguished colleagues in this volume.
I have observed that Ken Arrow, Larry Klein, Jim Tobin, and Bob Solow
often agree even on public policy issues they may more often disagree
with Jim Buchanan. But if Milton Friedman, or George Stigler, or Ted
Schultz to mention just a few equally notable luminaries had hap
pened to be present in this year's sample, the disagreement/agreement
ratio would have increased quite sharply. And we could perhaps liven
up the discussion even further by adding Bob Lucas or Sam Bowles.
I have not even begun to exhaust the spectrum of policy views we can
find within the economics profession.
Although you may have seen relatively little disagreement among the
authors in this volume, the public is not mistaken in its perception that
economists disagree frequently and vociferously. The fact of the mat
ter is that, no matter what our views on matters of public policy, we
can almost certainly find a relatively prominent economist to defend
them; and this democratic indiscipline of the profession is well known
to all readers of the daily press. We have Keynesian economics,
monetarism, supply-side economics, rational expectations, and budget
balancing, not to mention free trade, protection for infant industries,
and proponents of the income tax, the single tax, the sales tax, and almost
no taxes at all.
When national economic problems are under discussion, economists
disagree as to whether to give priority to inflation, the public debt,
employment, taxes, the trade balance, or the rate of interest. Clearly,
these priorities have much to say about what policies economists will
advocate. During the late seventies, there was a massive shift in primary
concern from employment to inflation, but the shift was not unanimous
and left the profession in as much disarray as before or more. Likewise,
it is easy to start a lively argument about whether taxes should be rais
ed in order to stem the rise in the national debt, or whether the burden
of the national debt on the federal budget should be relieved by lower
ing interest rates.
And finally, economists disagree about their forecasts for the economy
over the coming months or years. We can almost always find optimists,
pessimists, and flat-planers, although their relative numbers vary from
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time to time. Nor do these proportions much correlate with what the
economy actually does. Economic forecasting is in low repute, often
also among economists, who can even provide theoretical reasons why
it should be impossible to predict the course of the business cycle or
the stock market. The last recession saw a high casualty rate among
economic forecasting units attached to business firms at a time of budget
crunch, they were seen as dispensable.
With this cacophony of economic voices, it is not surprising that the
status of economics as a science is sometimes challenged by a bemused
public. Isn't a science supposed to provide accurate predictions about
its phenomena? Is economics therefore not a science? We had best
reserve our judgment a bit until I get on with my story. We are aware
that meteorologists also disagree widely in their forecasts, but we would
not doubt that meteorology is a science. For meteorologists have built
a model of the atmospheric processes that is consistent with the basic,
well-supported, laws of physics. Possessing such a model does not
guarantee an ability to predict the future of the weather with any great
accuracy.
In recent years, there has even been a very exciting development in
the field of mathematics that suggests that certain complex systems
(systems of nonlinear equations) may behave in a way that makes them
inherently unpredictable. Such systems are called "chaotic," and their
central characteristic is that a tiny displacement of their initial condi
tions sometimes causes them to go off on completely divergent paths.
We don't know whether the atmosphere is actually a chaotic system,
but if it is, the wingbeats of a butterfly in Singapore may cause a tor
nado in Chicago.
We also don't know whether the economy is a chaotic system. There
are some statistical tests that can be applied to time series the money
supply, or stock prices, or other economic series to distinguish be
tween simple randomness and the kind of chaos and unpredictability
I am describing here. Some attempts have been made recently by
economists to test whether various economic time series are chaotic,
but the results so far are inconclusive. (The September 1987 issue of
the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 8, Number
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3, which is devoted to the subject of chaos in dynamic economic systems,
will provide the reader with a good introduction to the topic.) I men
tion chaos to indicate that we should be wary of using prediction as
a test of science, and especially of whether economics is a science, for
an understanding of mechanisms does not guarantee predictability.

Private Agreement Among Economists
If it is well known that economists disagree, it is less well known
to the general public, although perhaps not among economists, that there
is a very high level of agreement among them. I will try to explain the
apparent paradox and show why this is so. In spite of the disagreements
I have enumerated, economists subscribe, nearly to a man and woman,
to a common central core of theory, and above all, to a way of reason
ing about economic questions. Before I state what the common core
is, let me give an example of the kind of agreement that this communality
produces.
Suppose that during a period of gasoline shortage, the govern
ment issues ration tickets to the poor to guarantee them an
adequate supply of gasoline at a moderate price. Should the
law be written so that the poor may sell their ration tickets
to others if they would prefer the money to the gasoline, or
should such exchanges be prohibited by law?
When this question was presented to a national sample of lay per
sons, about 80 percent replied that the exchange should be prohibited
that the poor should be able to use the tickets only to purchase gasoline.
When the same question was presented to a national sample of
economists, virtually all responded that the exchange should be allowed.'
The reason economists are able to agree on this conclusion is that
they apply to the problem a common set of assumptions and inference
procedures. All (or nearly all) economists assume that every person
is a utility maximizer: (1) possesses a consistent, comprehensive utili
ty function that orders all the possible alternatives of choice, and (2)
selects among alternatives so as to maximize subjective expected utili
ty. "Subjective expected" means that the decisionmaker assigns (sub-
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jectively) probabilities to all possible outcomes of each available alter
native, and averages the utilities of these outcomes, using the subjec
tive probabilities as weights. Economists (nearly all economists) claim
that people do behave so as to maximize utility, and that they ought
to behave in this way, which they regard as uniquely rational.
Now in the rationing case, if the potential seller and buyer both agree
on a price for the tickets, this must mean using the standard economic
reasoning that each one thinks that his or her utility will be increased
by the exchange. Hence, they will make the exchange if they are per
mitted to, and they should be permitted to because then everyone will
be better off. When certain other conditions are also satisfied, the ex
change is said to produce a Pareto optimum, a situation that could not
be altered in any way to produce an increase in utility for both par
ticipants. Economists also refer to solutions of decision problems that
are Pareto optimal as producing an efficient allocation of resources.
My account of the core of standard economic theory is, of course,
something of an oversimplification. Many of the conclusions, particularly
the normative ones, depend on the economic system being in a stable
state of competitive equilibrium, and only under these conditions can
a Pareto optimum guarantee an efficient allocation of resources. My
simplified version, however, gives a clear enough picture of the nature
of contemporary economic reasoning that is subscribed to by almost
every school of thought.
Even Marx, in Das Kapital subscribes to this theory and this way
of reasoning. So does Keynes; for the General Theory uses, on every
page, standard economic reasoning. So do the rational expectationists,
like Lucas and Sargent, and the monetarists, like Friedman. So do my
predecessors in this volume. The allegiance of economists of all sects
and descriptions to subjective expected utility maximization is hardly
less unanimous than the allegiance of physicists to Newton's Three Laws
of Motion in their relativised form.

Disagreement From Consensus
Now I appear to have hooked myself on a serious dilemma. If
economists agree in the way I have just outlined, how can they disagree
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in the ways I described earlier? They can disagree because, in order
to apply the standard core theory to real-world problems, that theory
has to be augmented by additional assumptions, especially assumptions
about what information people have, and how they deal with uncer
tainty and with their own limited capacities for computation. Economists
disagree about these auxiliary assumptions; and as a result of the
disagreement, reach very different conclusions even though applying
identical modes of reasoning. That is not surprising: conclusions de
pend on premises. Using identical laws of logic, we will reach quite
different conclusions about the visibility of swans in dim light from the
premise "All swans are white" than from "All swans are black."
Let me provide an example of the sources of disagreement in
economics from a central topic of macroeconomics: business cycle
theory. The theory of static equilibrium under perfect competition
developed by Arrow, Debreu, and others proves that, under equilibrium
conditions, all resources will be fully employed: labor, capital, and so
on. However, most (not all) economists concede that the real world
is plagued by a fluctuating level of employment of both labor and pro
duction facilities, with periods, from time to time, of substantial
unemployment. How can we, within the framework of the accepted
theory and method of reasoning, reconcile general equilibrium theory
with the fact of unemployment and underemployment of resources. We
can do it by making one small change in the assumptions of rationality
by introducing one small grain of irrationality or nonrationality into
behavior, and allowing that grain to grow into the pearl of unemploy
ment of resources.
Keynes uses several mechanisms to produce this result; I will refer
to just one of them. Starting with a standard classical model, he assumes
that labor is not always quite rational, specifically, that in bargaining
for wages, labor sometimes confuses the money wage, in current prices,
with the real wage, adjusted for price changes. Labor is just a little
stupid, and this stupidity draws the system away from full-employment
equilibrium into a situation in which unemployment can appear and
persist.
Lucas, a rational expectationist usually regarded as standing at the
opposite end of the policy spectrum from Keynes, also admits that there
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is sometimes unemployment in the real world. He too starts out with
a model of perfect rationality, which of course leads to full-employment
equilibrium. He also introduces a grain of sand to displace that
equilibrium and produce unemployment. His grain of sand consists in
assuming that businessmen are not always quite rational, specifically,
that they sometimes stupidly mistake a shift in the general price level for
a change in relative prices in their own industry. This mistake (from lack
of knowledge or ignorance in calculation) draws the system away from
full-employment equilibrium into a state where there is unemployment.
So both Keynes and Lucas depart from the assumptions of perfect
rationality in order to account for a fact of the real world, the fact of
periodic unemployment. Both introduce a grain of irrationality in the
form of a confusion between monetary and real prices what economists
usually call "money illusion." In the case of Keynes, the liberal, the
money illusion is suffered by labor; in the case of Lucas, the conser
vative, it is suffered by businessmen. Presumably we know our friends
better than we know strangers! Not only do they introduce irrationality
in different ways, but they draw different conclusions, as a consequence,
as to what policies should be followed to deal with the resulting
unemployment.
In understanding the disagreement between Lucas and Keynes, it is
important to remember where it comes from. It does not come from
the central theory of rational economic behavior, on which they both
agree, but from the auxiliary assumptions the grains of sand on which
they disagree. That might lead us to ask where these auxiliary assump
tions come from. They are empirical assumptions, assumptions about
how particular groups of human beings behave in the real world, about
what they know and don't know and how they use that knowledge or
are affected by that ignorance. But you will search the pages of Keynes
and Lucas vainly if you want to know the evidence from which these
crucial premises are drawn. They are presented simply as "obvious"
facts, as something "everyone knows." A dangerous procedure for a
science that purports to give an account of the real world!
It is not only in business cycle theory that the auxiliary assumptions
do all the work of deriving the conclusions. Here is an example drawn
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from microeconomics. In recent years, we have seen a kind of economic
imperialism in which microeconomists seek to demonstrate that they
can use the standard theory to explain not only strictly economic
phenomena but the phenomena of politics, the family, and indeed of
all of our social institutions as well. A vigorous and well-known leader
of this intellectual imperialism is Gary Becker, of the University of
Chicago; and James Buchanan also belongs to this school of thought,
especially as it applies to political institutions.
Let us see how Becker, in his book on the family, deals with the
observed fact that the employment of women has increased rapidly in
recent years. Becker explains that this is due to the fact that the de
mand curve for women employees has shifted upward during this same
time more women will be employed at any wage, and hence wages
will rise as more women are attracted from the home to the labor market.
Becker cites no particular evidence for the shift in the demand curve,
and indeed, it is not clear that during the period he is concerned with,
the wages of women increased much more than the wages of men.
Moreover, there are alternative explanations we could consider.
Perhaps the utility function of women has shifted, for example, as a
consequence of consciousness raising, so that they prefer outside work
to homework more than they did before. Or perhaps the productivity
of homework has increased with the availability of household appliances,
while the demand for it is relatively inelastic. All of these shifts would
cause an increase in the number of women employed outside the home,
and we are far from exhausting the list of possible explanations.
Again we see that the conclusion (which matches an observed fact)
is not a consequence of the theory of rationality. The real work is done
by the auxiliary assumptions, and without additional empirical evidence
(which Becker does not bother to provide), we do not know which of
the possible auxiliary assumptions is actually satisfied, and hence is caus
ing the phenomenon. Without taking seriously the task of verifying the
auxiliary assumptions empirically, we can find an "explanation" for
any fact; our theory becomes tautological and vacuous. As Poincare
once remarked about another theory: "An explanation was necessary,
and was forthcoming; they always are; hypotheses are what we lack
the least."
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In economics, hypotheses are certainly what we lack the least. Aux
iliary hypotheses, frequently manufactured in the armchair, are in good
supply. What is lacking is empirical evidence to test them. Why don't
economists devote themselves more vigorously to testing their auxiliary
hypotheses? I can only conjecture (the question is one that should also
be settled by facts, historical and sociological facts about the economics
profession).
First, there is a tradition of a priorism and deductivism in economics,
which goes back at least to Adam Smith (although Smith was not reluctant
to take facts where he could find them). It is more fun, and easier, to
play with theory, especially mathematical theory, than to grub for facts.
As long as the tradition persists in the profession, editors will accept
analyses based on postulated facts or facts tested by casual empiricism.
Second, a few philosophers of economics, for example Boland, think
that the standard theory is true by definition, and not empirically
refutable. Friedman holds a related position, arguing that economic
theory can only be tested by assessing the empirical correctness of its
"predictions," and not by testing the correctness of its "assumptions."
I have not the time here to argue the fallacies in these positions, which
have been pointed out by numerous economists on other occasions. I
mention these erroneous beliefs simply to account for the relative in
difference of economists to empirical evidence.
Third, economists of course do carry out a very considerable amount
of empirical work to test their theories, but they employ only a narrow
range of methodologies in doing so. As a result, they spend much of
their time viewing the world through the wrong end of a telescope, with
correspondingly foggy results. By "the wrong end of a telescope" I
mean that economists usually test their theories with the help of rather
aggregated data about the economy which have mainly been gathered
for practical purposes unconnected with economic theory and whose
concepts and units bear only a faint resemblance to the concepts to which
they are matched in the theory.
Robert Eisner has described these difficulties eloquently in his re
cent presidential address to the American Economic Association, which
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appears as the lead article in the March 1989 American Economic Review,
79:1-14. His summary (p. 11) displays the seriousness of his concerns:
I have . . . noted some pitfalls in using current and past
variables in analyses that depend critically upon expectations
of the future. I have warned of confusion in employing nar
rowly defined measures of income and product in evaluating
flows and trends in comprehensive earnings and output. I
have argued that particularly large dangers abound in bas
ing policy on conventional measures of private and public
saving, investment and capital. I have suggested that usual
estimates of some of the critical behavioral relations of
macroeconomics may be suspect because of a failure to match
theoretical constructs with appropriate empirical counterparts.
Very generally, I conclude, it is important in economics as
elsewhere to know what we are talking about.
A very sophisticated body of econometric theory and methodology
has been created since World War II to deal with the problem of carry
ing out economic analyses with data that are too aggregated, measure
the wrong concepts, are too infrequently collected, and are exceeding
ly noisy. The experience of the past 50 years has shown that these
sophisticated econometric tools do not compensate for the poor quality
of the data to which they are applied.
Other kinds of data can of course be obtained; data that tell us
something about the expectations, preferences, and choices of economic
actors at micro levels. Opinion and attribute studies can be conducted
(and of course have been). Actual decisionmaking processes can be
observed in business organizations (and of course have been). But polling
data and "case studies" of individual behavior are mistrusted in or
thodox economic methodology. The use of these kinds of data to discover
the realities of economic life and to provide an empirical basis for the
auxiliary assumptions we need will require a revolution in methodological
beliefs in economics, and a revolution in the training of economists,
who are not now trained to use these techniques.
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Validity of the Standard Theory
If casual empiricism and the neglect of available sources of empirical
evidence are a major scandal in contemporary economics, equally scan
dalous is the retention of beliefs, central to the standard theory, that
are empirically false. For when investigators have begun to examine,
in field and laboratory, the central assumptions of the standard theory
not just the auxiliary assumptions this time, but the very core of the
theory it has turned out that these assumptions do not fit the facts.
For example, research in the 1950s, reported in The Behavioral Theory
of the Firm and elsewhere, shows that business firms are not the sim
ple profit-maximizing entities that the standard theory assumes them
to be. They sometimes settle for "satisfactory" profits. They operate
with slack that is only reduced under the pressure of hard times. They
suffer from internal power struggles. They simply do not behave as
required to meet the conditions of competitive equilibrium with effi
cient use of resources.
Second, an increasing number of studies of experimental markets,
operated under the controlled conditions of the laboratory, have shown
that it is easy to construct market situations where behavior will depart
widely from the predictions of the standard theory. Vernon Smith,
Charles Plott, and others have shown that behavior tends to settle toward
the predicted market equilibrium in simple markets, but that it is not
at all difficult to produce booms and busts even under conditions where
participants could easily compute the correct, rational behavior that
would produce stability and equilibrium.
Third, a long series of studies by Allais, Kahneman, Tversky, and
others have shown serious departures from utility-maximizing rationality
when choices are made under conditions of uncertainty. Respondents,
for example, opt much less frequently for a surgical operation where
there is a 20 percent chance of dying than for an otherwise identically
described operation where there is an 80 percent chance of living.
The sum and substance of these findings is that people just do not
maximize utility. They do not have consistent utility functions (Allais).
They do not reason correctly and consistently about probabilities and

108
risks (Kahneman and Tversky). They use rules of thumb (heuristics)
to simplify choice (Cyert and March). They look for satisfactory courses
of action, they satisfice, instead of optimizing (Simon).
Nature is supposed to abhor vacuums, and the demonstration that a
theory is empirically false, as the standard theory of economic choice
most certainly is, appears to leave a large vacuum. Is there anything
to fill it? Indeed there is. Over the past 30 years, cognitive psychology
has developed a large body of empirically tested theory of decisionmaking and problemsolving. So far, economists have mostly ignored it.
The theory of decisionmaking to be found in psychology today
substitutes satisficing for optimizing. It gives central position to the limits
of human ability to deal with real-world complexity, and to the methods
of radical approximation that are used to remove this mismatch of adap
tive power to problem difficulty. Enlarging the scope of economic deci
sion theory, it does not assume that the alternatives of choice are given
a priori, but shows how they can be generated by selective (heuristic)
search in problem spaces. It is beginning to investigate the processes
that focus human attention on certain problems so that others are ig
nored, and the processes of representing or framing problems in terms
of their most important dimensions, omitting those that are less
important.
The research that has produced the new theory has also produced new
methodologies that are relevant for economic research. Methods have
been devised to use computers to simulate complex human thought pro
cesses and thereby to model problemsolving and decisionmaking situa
tions of real-world complexity. The theory and practice of taking
thinking-aloud protocols from human subjects while they are thinking
and solving problems has been developed and explored.
Of course these developments do not mean that the problems of
economics have been solved and that economists need merely to replace
their standard theory with the new theory and apparatus. Certainly few
of the economic implications of the new theory have been worked out.
But a vacuum does not exist, and would not exist if the standard theory,
or its invalid components, were simply abandoned. There is a firm foun
dation on which economic research can proceed.
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What is to be Done?
I have described what I believe to be the serious problems facing
economics and a path toward their solution. Both the auxiliary assump
tions and the central postulates of classical economics must be revised
on the basis of sound empirical evidence. To get the proper evidence,
economists must receive new kinds of research training, much of it bor
rowed from cognitive psychology and organization theory. Doctoral
candidates must learn how to obtain data about beliefs, attitudes, and
expectations. They must learn how to study decisionmaking processes
inside and outside business organizations. They must learn how to
analyze and interpret the verbal reports of human subjects in both
laboratory and field situations. They must learn how to conduct
laboratory experiments.
Increasing numbers of mainline economists are beginning to perceive
and accept the need for these reforms. I have already mentioned some
of them, and I could add many names to the list. But there is a long
way to go.
The inability of economics today to play the policy role to which it
aspires is a major source of pressure toward reform. The hubris of the
1950s, when many economists thought we knew how to fine tune the
economy, has disappeared in the face of stagflation and the ideological
struggles between Keynesians and rational expectationists. Nevertheless,
the reform will not be rapid.
As it progresses, however, the alteration of economics toward a
responsible empiricism will gradually remove the present scandals in
economic science: not just the public scandal of disarray in the policy
arena, but the private scandal, known best to economists themselves,
of a science that nearly renounced the practice of looking hard at the
empirical evidence that was supposed to provide its foundations.
The late Tjalling Koopmans, a distinguished econometrician and a
Nobel Laureate in economics, warned, in a celebrated book review
against "measurement without theory." The remarks of Robert Eisner,
quoted earlier, echo the same concern. The concern for economics that
I have emphasized in my remarks is the complement of that one theory
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without measurement. What distinguishes science from every other form
of human intellectual activity is that it disciplines speculation with facts.
Theory and data are the two blades of the scissors. But the metaphor
is not quite right, for the blades are not symmetric. When theories and
facts are in conflict, the theories must yield. Economics has strayed
from that simple principle, and it must return to it.
NOTE
1. I have only a newspaper reference to the original survey, which was conducted in Canada.
I have repeated the finding by polling several audiences at my talks, but I must confess that when
I tried to replicate the result during my talk in Kalamazoo, a majority of the noneconomists pres
ent voted like economists Perhaps most of my audience had been taking economics courses from
a very persuasive faculty

INDEX
Able, Stephen, 58nll
Aggregative value, 84
Allais, Maurice, 107
American Keynesianism, 3, 26-29, 32, 36, 44
Angell, Wayne, 58n7
Anti-Keynesian. See New-classical macroeconomic theory
Arrow, K J , 2-3, 82, 94, 102
Ball, L , 65-66, 76nl
Barro, Robert J., 67
Becker, Gary, 104
Benassy-Malmvaud fixed-price model, 30, 33
Bowles, S , 94
Brennan, Geoffrey, 93
Buchanan, James M , 6-7, 84, 92, 104
Business cycle theory, 3, 26, 30, 66, 75-76, 102-3
Centrally planned economies, 54-56
Chaotic systems, 99-100
Choice, constitutional and in-constitutional levels, 91-93
Classical economic theory, 42, 46, 69-70
Computer science, 3
Constitutional order, 91-93
Contractanan position, 91
Corrado, Carol, 58nlO
Cyert, R , 108
Data, 53
Debreu, G., 102
Debt, Third World, 54
Decisionmakmg theory to enlarge scope of economic theory, 6, 108; under uncertainty, 16
DeLong, J., 75, 76n4
Demand for money, 43-44, 46
Deregulation, as macroeconomic policy, 50-51, and supply-side economics, 53, 54
Developing countries, 55-56
Diamond, Peter, 35-36
Disequilibrium economics, 67, 69-70
Dornbusch, Rudiger, 28
Econometrics, 41-42, 56, effectiveness in use of, 42-43, as forecasting tool, 51-53; limitations
to use of, 31; use by centrally planned economies and developing countries,54-56, See
also Macroeconometncs
Economic choice, 82, and equilibrium strategy, 34, validity of theory, 107-8
Economic system, 11-13
Economic theory, 100-101, 104
Economy, aggregate, 42
Economy-as-order concept, 88-92
111

112
Eisner, Robert, 105-6, 109
Equilibrium: dispute among Keynesian and classical economists over, 69-70, in economic system,
13-14; in exchange process, 83, general theory of, 62, 102, See also Disequilibrium
economics
Equilibrium strategy, 34-36
Exchange process, 82-83, difference from choice process, 82-83, with economy-as-order
concept, 89-90; with utility maximization intent, 88-89
Expectations, about the future, 3, 14-15; model-generated, 56; and uncertainty, 17, use in
macroeconomic research of, 46-49
False trading, 69
Fiscal policy, 42, 49, 53
Fischer, Stanley, 28
Fisher effect, 74, 76n2
Forecasting, 5, 51-53
Framing, 20
Free-market economics, 37, 54
Fnedman, Edward, 58nll
Fnedman, Milton, 8, 81, 94, 101
Fnsch, Ragnar, 15
Fudenberg, Drew D., 36
Future See Expectations; Uncertainty
Game theory as analytic tool, 34-36, 79-80, to facilitate abstract understanding of
economics, 82
Gordon, Robert, 28
Grandmont, Jean-Michael, 67
Great Depression, 26, 49, 61, 66
Green, Donald, 58nll
Grossman, Sanford, 67
Guger, Alois, 58n6
Hahn, Frank, 33-34
Haltmeier, Jane, 58nlO
Heller, Walter P , 35
Hicks, John R , 15, 26, 67
Higgins, Christopher, 58nll
Howrey, E Philip, 57, 58nlO
Human behavior under uncertainty, 3, 16
Hysteresis, 69
Inflation, 49-50
Information as an economic variable, 3, 18-19, 21
International considerations, 44, 49
Irrationality, 102
IS-LM paradigm, 27, 32, 55
Jensen, Morten, 58n5
Jonassen, Morten, 58n5

113
Kahneman, D., 107-8
Keynes, John M , 4, 5-6, 15, 26, 33, 43, 44, 58n2, 61-64, 101-3
Keynes effect, 73, 76n2
Keynesian-neoclassical synthesis, 43
Keynesian theory of, 26, 27, 38, 42, 43; after Bretton Woods, 48-49, of business fluctuations,
75-76, development and limitations of, 44-46, 49, disagreement with classical theory,
69-70, disagreement with monetarism, 27-28; effectiveness as macroeconomic policy
instrument, 51-52, See also New Keynesian macroeconomics
Keynes-Leontief model, 43, 46
Klein, Lawrence, 4-5, 10, 12, 58nl, 93, 94
Knight, Frank H., 88, 94n4
Knowledge, 3, 19, 21, 22
Koopmans, Tjallmg, 56, 58nl2, 109
Laissez-faire economics, 37, 86-87; See also Free-market economics
Lau, Lawrence, 56
Lmdbeck, Assar, 71-72
Lucas, Robert, 37, 48, 50, 94, 101, 102-3
McNees, Stephen, 52, 54, 58n9
Macroeconometncs, 4-5, 41-42; in centrally planned and developing economies, 54-56,
developments in, 56-57, forecasting techniques, 51-53, tracking supply-side economics,
54
Macroeconomic policy, in 1970s and 80s, 50-51, shift in emphasis. Western market economies, 49
Macroeconomic theory, 3, 25, 31-32, 36-37, 42, 62, development and current practices using,
62-65, Keynesian theory of, 43, lack of need for, 79, 84-86, modeling using expecta
tions, 47; need to stress international considerations, 44
Mahnvaud, Edmond, 67
Mankiw, G., 65-66, 76nl
March, J. G , 108
Market failure, 38
Marshall, Alfred, 43, 69
Marx, Karl, 101
Maximization, in competitive game, 83, and exchange process, 82-84, and rationality, 16-17,
of utility, 88-90, 100-101, 107-8
Microeconomic theory as foundation for macroeconomics, 29, 62-65, See also Single agent
explanation
Modigliam, Franco, 26
Monetarism, 101; basis for theory, 43-44, and Keynesianism, 27-28, and macroeconometncs,
46, and macroeconomic policy, 50-51, neglect of fiscal policy by, 53, opposed to
Keynesiasm, 27-28
Monetary policy, 49, 53
Neo-classical macroeconomic theory, 43, dismissal of Keynesian theory, 70, supply-side
version of, 53-54
New-classical macroeconomic theory, 3-4, 6, 28-31, 36, 38; and empirical verification, 31,
and rational expectations, 29-30

114
New Keynesian macroeconomics, 32, 65-66
Niwa, Haruki, 58nll
Nozick, Robert, 87
Own-model-generated expectations, 48
Pareto, Vilfredo, 12
Pareto optimum, 101
Pesaran, M H., 58n4
Phillips curve, 43
Pigou effect, 73-74
Plott, Charles, 107
Pomcare, 104
Political economy, 92
Prescott, 37
Price rigidity interpretation in Keynesian theory of, 67-68, See also Wage stickmess
Prices contingent and future, 17-18, as conveyors of information, 19, as coordinating
instrument in economic system, 132, effect on aggregate demand, 72-75
Psychology, 3, 8, 23, 108, 109
Rational expectations theory, 18, 29-30, 101; econometric methods to estimate, 47-48,
limitations of, 48-49
Rationality, confirmation of lack of, 20-21, criteria in economic theory for, 16-17, See also
Irrationality
Real balance effect See Pigou effect
Resource allocation, 12, 81-82
Robbms, Lionel, 81, 82
Romer, D , 65-66, 76nl
Samuelson, Paul A., 52, 58n8
Sargent, Thomas, 101
Scarcity, 81

Schultz, T W., 94
Schumpeter, Joseph, 69
Search equilibrium model, 35-36
Shackle, G L. S , 47, 58n3
Simon, Herbert, 7-8, 108
Single-agent explanation, 63-64
Smith, Adam, 12, 16, 62, 94n3
Smith, Vernon, 107
Socialism, 86
Sojo, E , 58nlO
Solow, Robert, 3-4, 94
State, functions and scope dependent on economy, 87-88; See also Economy-as-order concept
Stigler, G , 94
Summers, L , 75, 76n4
Supply-side economic policy, 53-54

115
Taylor staggered-contract model, 75
Time series analysis, 56-57
Tobm, James, 5-6, 76n3, 94
Tullock, Gordon, 92
Tversky, A , 107-8
Two-gap econometric model, 55
Uncertainty, 3, 16-18
Usher, Dan, 93
Utility maximization, 88-90, 100-101, 107Veblen, Thorstem, 19-20
Velocity See Demand for money
Vinmg, R , 93
Wage stickmess, 33, 47, 70-74, 76
Walras, Leon, 12, 29, 69
Walrasian Auctioneer, 68, 69

0-88099-083-X

